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Clinical Psychology

Eyewitness Confidence and the Impact of Expert Testimony By A
Psychologist Versus An Opposing Psychologist (149 pp.)
Director:

Herman A, Walters, Ph

The use of expert psychological testimony on the unreliability
of eyewitness testimony has become increasingly common in recent
years.
However, no previous studies have examined the impact of
an opposing psychologist giving expert testimony on the relia^
bility of eyewitness testimony, a phenomenon occurring more
frequently in the courtroom today.
120 subjects were randomly assigned to one of six experimental
conditions.
Half of the subjects viewed a videotape of a highly
confident eyewitness, while half viewed an eyewitness of low
confidence.
Subjects then viewed a videotape of a psychologist
giving expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness
testimony, or viewed the above psychologist plus an opposing
psychologist giving testimony on the reliability of eyewitness
testimony, or no further videotapes (control group). Subjects
then completed Likert-scale questions concerning the guilt or
innocence of the defendant, reasons for and confidence in their
guilt versus innocence decision.
Subjects who viewed the expert psychologist alone more fre
quently believed that the eyewitness had identified an innocent
person rather than the gunman in a crime; they reported reduced
guilt ratings, more decision confidence, and lower estimated
percentages of accurate eyewitness testimony. When subjects
subsequently viewed the opposing psychologist, they believed
equivocally that the eyewitness had identified the gunman or
an innocent person, similar to Controls.
Expert testimony did
not differentially effect subjects exposed to high or low con
fidence eyewitnesses.
However, expert testimony alone did
reduce subjects' reported reliance on eyewitness confidence as
a basis for their decision; these effects were mitigated by
arguments presented by the opposing psychologist.
Subjects who
heard only expert testimony based their decision on it more
than subjects who heard both expert and opposing expert testi
mony.
This study was the third in a series on expert/eyewitness
testimony and replicated the findings of the first, but not the
previous, study.
In summary, results support the use of expert testimony in
cases where eyewitness testimony is important and suggest that
an opposing psychologist will mitigate the effects of an expert
giving testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony.
Implications for further research were discussed.
ii
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Introduction
As Justice Felix Frankfurter once noted, the
identification of strangers is proverbially untrust
worthy.

The hazards of such testimony are established

by a formidable number of instances in the records of
English and American trials"

(Woocher, 1977).

Even

the Supreme Court has emphasized the dangers inherent
in eyewitness identification evidence,

stating:

"The

vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known;
the annals of criminal law are rife with mistaken
identification"

{Woocher, 1977).

Yet jurors tend to "overbelieve" eyewitnesses.

A

juror's opinion regarding whether or not an eyewitness
properly identified an innocent person can critically
decide the juror's vote

(Wells and Lindsay,

1983) .

The

average juror views evidence of identification by an
eyewitness as absolute proof;

for the layperson, visual

identification of the defendant by the victim or witness
often provides the most persuasive evidence which cannot
be overcome by contrary evidence supporting the accused
(Wall,

1965).

Wells, Lindsay and Ferguson

(1979)

found

that eyewitnesses were believed almost 80% of the time.
In one condition of a study conducted by Loftus

(1974),

jurors were told that an eyewitness to a robbery had
less than 20/400 vision, had not been wearing his
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glasses, and could not possibly have seen the robber's
face; yet 68% of the jurors still convicted the defen
dant .
Unless some steps are taken to ensure that the
unreliability of eyewitness evidence is brought to
the attention of the triers of fact, mistaken identi
fications will continue to be a major source of
wrongful convictions

(Woocher, 1977).

Yarmey

(1979),

an expert in the area of eyewitness testimony, concluded
that misidentification is more the rule than the excep
tion.

In a study staged in a University classroom, a

professor was "attacked” in front of 141 student ob
servers.

Afterward, the eyewitnesses were asked to

describe the attacker.

Such descriptions were grossly

inaccurate, with a total accuracy score of only 25%
of the total possible points.

In fact, an innocent

bystander present at the scene of the crime was chosen
by subjects 25% of the time.

Even the professor,

the

attacked victim, incorrectly identified the innocent
bystander as the attacker

(Buckhout,

1974) .

One proposed safeguard against convictions resulting
from faulty identifications is the admission of expert
psychological testimony on the reliability or unrelia
bility of eyewitness identification

(Woocher, 1977).

This trend, and the known inaccuracies of eyewitness
testimony, warrant considerable attention from experts
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in the judicial system and from researchers examining
relevant issues in forensic psychology.
This paper will focus on the following objectives:
a.

the review of psychological factors relevant to
the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness
testimony ;

b.

in relationship to the above-mentioned factors,
discuss memory processes as they relate to
eyewitness performance ;

c.

discuss the accuracy-confidence relationship
in eyewitness testimony, and the tendency for
jurors to rely on eyewitness confidence to assess
witness accuracy;

d.

review expert testimony and opposing expert
testimony research and its potential for reversing
some of the justice-impairing effects; and

e.

present a study which compared the effects of
different types of expert testimony (opposing
versus supporting) following an eyewitness of
high or low confidence.
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Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony
Despite the alarmingly and unacceptably high number
of false identifications and misses given by eyewitnesses,
the criminal justice system continues to depend heavily
on such testimony.
as directy
however,

Eyewitness testimony is considered

rather than circumstantial, evidence.

Recently,

in a variety of books and reviews, psychologists

have begun to question the esteem given to eyewitness
testimony by the criminal justice system (Brown^ Deffenbacher, and Sturgill, 1977; Buckhout,

1974, 1976; Buckhout,

Alper, Chern, Silverberg, and Somovits,
Pittner and Goldstein,

1974; Egan,

1977 ; Katz and Reid, 1977 ; Leippe,

Wells, and O strom, 1978; Lloyd-Bostock and Clifford,
Loftus,

1979; Woocher,

19 77 ; Yarmey, 1979).

1983;

Through

research, psychologists have delineated over a score of
factors which affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.
Such experiments yield almost uniform results:

Most

observers make significant errors on almost every
facet of the description,

from the duration of the event,

the physical description of the attacker and the clothing
worn,

to the words spoken, the weapon used, and even the

sequence of events

(Woocher, 1977).

Yet:

...most juries, and even some judges, are unaware
of the sources of error in eyewitness testimony
and consequently place undue faith in its veracity...
For the layperson, visual identification of the
defendant by the victim or the witness often
provides the most persuasive evidence, which
cannot be overcome by contrary evidence supporting
the accused (Woocher, 1977).
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Knowledge of such factors would certainly facilitate
the jurors* decision-making process, for they are the
people required to make a judgment about the reliabil
ity of eyewitness testimony in a given factual situation
In a recent survey, Loftus

(1979)

found that citizens

were correct only half the time in regard to some im
portant assumptions about eyewitness behavior.

While

entire reviews of these factors have been written else
where and are beyond the scope of this paper, those
factors applicable to the proposed study will be re
viewed briefly herein.
Research has demonstrated that people often exper
ience difficulty in estimating the duration of an
event

(Doehring, 1961; Block,

1974).

Eyewitnesses are

often asked to estimate time in a courtroom trial, and
have a marked tendency to overestimate the duration of
an incident.

In studies using staged crimes of assault

and theft on university campuses

(Buckhout, 19 74;

Buckhout, Alper, Chern, Silverberg, and Somovits, 1975),
subjects estimated the duration of an event to be twoand-a-half times as long as it had actually lasted.
Another study which confirmed this tendency to over
estimate time was done by Marshall
subjects view a 4 2 second film.

(1966), who had

Two weeks later,

subjects were asked to estimate the length of the film
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and, on the average,

estimated the length as 90 seconds.

An additional study which supports the tendency for
witnesses to overestimate time was done by Johnson and
Scott

(1976, cited in Loftus,

1979).

Subjects in this

study viewed a target for only four seconds; males
overestimated that the target was presented for seven
seconds, while females overestimated that the target
was viewed for 25 seconds.
Researchers
and Werner,

(Filer and Meals,

1961)

1959; Langer, Wapner,

found that time is perceived to pass

more slowly when the observer is caught in an anxietyproducing situation.

The desire to escape makes it

seem as if the unpleasant event is lasting longer than
it actually is

(Buckhout,

1975).

Woccher

(1977)

found

that persons tend to judge time by the amount of
activity

occurring.

A sudden, action-packed event

like a crime often elicits an overestimation of the
time passed because of the flurry of activity which
has occurred.

If the witness is in an anxiety-

provoking or stress-producing situation, there is a
tendency to further overestimate the amount of elapsed
time

(Sarason and Stoops,

1978).

In addition, a complex

situation may increase the tendency to overestimate time.
Schiffman and Bobko

(1974)

found that as the level of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

page
stimulus complexity increased,

7

subjects’ estimates of

the interval involved also increased.

In conclusion,

"there is solid evidence that errors occur in people's
estimates of the duration of an incident, and the
errors are in the direction of overestimation"

(Loftus,

1979).
Crimes rarely occur in conditions ideal for obser
vation.
darkness,

Such common circumstantial factors such as
fast movement, and distance from the criminal

have been shown to decrease reliability of eyewitness
identification

(Levine and Tapp, 1973).

If lighting

is poor or rapidly changing, and distracting noise or
other activity is present, visual efficiency may drop
drastically

(Buckhout,

1975; Lezak,

1973),

Crimes often occur suddenly and unexpectedly,
catching the witness offguard and unprepared to focus
his or her perceptual attention on the important
features of the event

(Levine and Tapp,

1973).

The

period of observation of a criminal is often brief,
and eyewitnesses are frequently asked to make an iden
tification of a criminal after such an extremely short
viewing time; the already short viewing time will often
be even less than that reported by the eyewitness,
given the tendency for eyewitnesses to overestimate
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the duration of a crime.

Research has shown that the

shorter the observation time, the less reliable the
identification of the criminal and the poorer the
recall.

As viewing time is decreased,

the subjects'

memory for an image becomes more unreliable
Note 1).

Additionally,

(Fox,

researchers have shown that

picture recognition increases with exposure time
(Loftus, 1972; Hintzman,

1976; Laughery, et a l . ,

1971) .
While it is commonly believed,

especially within

the judicial system, that stress will increase the
ability of a victim or witness to recall a subjects'
identity,

it has been known since 1908 that this is

not the case.
Linder, 1979)

The Yerkes-Dodson Law

(in Braun and

states that "for a given task, there

is an optimal amount of arousal; a greater or lesser
degree of activation will result in less efficient
behavior".

While some studies have shown that a mild

level of anxiety may increase the attentiveness of the
observer and, therefore, result in more accurate
perception

(Munsterberg, 1908), psychological research

overwhelmingly demonstrates that perceptual abilities
are significantly decreased and distorted when an
observer is stressed.

During a crime, where a witness
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perceives that there is a high degree of danger imminent,
the level of stress may be considerably greater than the
optimal level.

In fact, research has shown that per

ceptual and memory processes are actually disrupted by
high levels of anxiety and stress
and Bruner,

1948; Stone, 1925).

(Harden, 1930; Postman
Anxious eyewitnesses

tend to be more inaccurate when giving testimony than
non-anxious eyewitnesses

(Muellar, Carlomusto, and

Goldstein, 1978; Siegal and Loftus,
Offerman,

1978; Zanni and

1978).

Under highly stressful conditions, people tend to
constrict attention, concentrating on fewer and fewer
details in their environment and attending less and
less to extraneous details

(Easterbrook, 1959).

People

may experience increased heart rate, rapid breathing,
excessive perspiration and, most importantly,
of the e ye s, which usually goes unnoticed
Stark,

1971).

fixation

(Noton and

Even experienced Air Force pilots tended

to become poor observers under stressful conditions,
narrowing attention to the airplane joystick, for
example

(Buckhout, 1974).

1973; Woocher,

1977)

Researchers

(Levine and Tapp,

have found that under stress, an

eyewitness may "close" his or her mind, focusing instead
on a "psychologically important" detail as a "perceptual
def en s e" .
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provided by Loftus

10

"weapon focus" is a phrase

{1979)

to describe the tendency

for an eyewitness to focus his/her attention on the
criminal's weapon.

This results in "a reduced ability

to recall details about the assailant, and to recog
nize the assailant at a later time".

As Kahneman

(1973)

has noted, increasing the amount of time spent focusing
on one stimulus will reduce the amount of time avail
able to perceive competing stimuli due to a limited
amount of processing capacity.
In a recent study. Wells and Leippe

(1981)

found

that eyewitnesses were more accurate in identifying a
criminal if they paid less attention to peripheral
details in the room, as measured by performance on a
test.

Jurors, however, were more likely to believe an

inaccurate witness who recalled peripheral details.
Johnson and Scott

(1976, cited in Loftus,

1977),

compared the ability of eyewitnesses to identify a
target individual in a violent "weapon" condition versus
a non-violent "no weapon" condition.

In this study,

observers were highly stress and either witnessed a
confederate run into the room after hearing a violent
interaction carrying a bloodied letter opener

("weapon"

condition); or, after hearing a calm conversation, w i t 
nessed a man enter the room holding a pen in his greased
hands

("no weapon" condition).

In the "no weapon"
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condition, 49 percent of the witnesses accurately
identified the confederate; in the "weapon" condition,
only one third of the subjects correctly identified
the criminal.
Similarly,

it has been shown that eyewitness testi

mony is less accurate following an emotionally-loaded
or violent incident than a less emotional or non-violent
incident
1978).

(Clifford and Hollin, 1981; Clifford and Scott,
Clifford and Scott

(1978)

found significantly

greater ability to recall events after viewing detectives
pressuring a reticent informant in a nonviolent manner
than for those who viewed a more violent version of the
same incident.
In addition, witnesses were significantly more
accurate in their testimony after viewing a woman being
asked for directions than after viewing a woman being
mugged

(Clifford and Hollin,

1981).

Loftus

(1979) has

warned that testimony regarding an emotionally loaded
incident should be treated more cautiously than tesimony
in regard to a less emotional event.
Accuracy in identifying a target individual decreases
as the number of criminals increases,

as the increased

number of criminals reduces the time available to focus
on other details.

Clifford and Hollin

(1981) found that

accuracy of eyewitness testimony decreased as the number
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of criminals was increased from one to three to five
criminals, especially in the violent "mugging*' condi
tion .
The uniqueness or distinctiveness of a suspect's
facial features is another factor which influences the
accuracy of eyewitness testimony.

Recent research has

shown that atypical or unusual faces are more readily
recognized than nondistinct or typical faces
and Muellar,

(Courtois

1981; Light, Kayra-Stuart, and Hollander,

1979; Going and Read,

1974).

Even one distinctive

feature may be sufficient to bias a witness toward
identifying a suspect

(Woocher, 1977).

Some of the

more common factors which may unfavorably increase a
suspect's chance of being selected are unusual physical
characteristics

(e.g., scars or tatoos), different

clothing, demeanor, facial expression, or anything
which increases dissimilarity to other suspects
(Woocher, 1977).

On the other hand, more typical-

looking males are more likely to be misidentifled,
especially if the suspect is described as average
(Courtois, and Muellar,

1981).

Another phenomenon common in many eyewitness
misidentifications is "unconscious transference", a
phrase coined by Williams

(1963, cited in Loftus, 1979)

in his description of an English murder case which may
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have resulted in the execution of an innocent man.
One of the witnesses who identified the defendant had
interacted with him briefly prior to the crime and
"may have unconsciously effected a transference"
(Williams^ 1963, in Loftus,

1979).

Unconscious

transference occurs when a person seen in an insignif
icant situation is recalled as a person viewed in a
significant event.

Or more specifically,

the phenomenon by which an otherwise
insignificant event, occurring immediately
before or after a significant event may,
upon recall, become merged with the most
significant event.
One consequence is
that, upon recollection, one could con
fuse the face of a person seen in an
insignificant event with that of a person
involved in a subsequent significant event
(Fishman and Loftus, 1978).
An illustrative and classic case of unconscious
transference has been provided by Wall

(1965).

An

employee who sold tickets in a railroad station was
robbed at gunpoint.

Subsequently, he mistakenly

identified a sailor from a lineup as the malefactor.
The sailor, however, had a credible alibi when ques
tioned and was released.

When the ticket agent was

questioned, he stated that he had identified the
sailor "because he looked familiar".

Subsequent in

vestigation revealed that the sailor had purchased
train tickets from this agent on three different
occasions.

The ticket agent had inaccurately connected
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the familiar sailor's face with the context of the
robbery.

Knowing the face is familiar but confusing the

context in which it was seen is a basic definition of
unconscious transference.
Another study which exemplifies the phenomenon of
unconscious transference was done by Buckhout

(1974).

An assault was staged in front of a classroom on a
professor.

Seven weeks later, witnesses attempted to

pick the assailant from an array of six photographs.
Over forty percent of the witnesses identified the
criminal as the innocent bystander who had been present
during the assault but was not the criminal.

Forty

percent of the witnesses accurately identified the
guilty person.
Similarly, Loftus

(1976)

provided subjects with a

story about six college students, with an accompanying
photograph of each story character, including a photo
graph of the criminal.

Three days later, half of the

subjects were required to identify the criminal from a
set of five pictures which did not include the criminal
but did include the face of a bystander incidental to
the story.

Results showed that 7 9 percent of the wit

nesses selected the innocent bystander.
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The phenomenon of unconscious transference brings
into question the common practice of asking a witness
to identify a criminal from a group of photographs.
Research demonstrates that a witness will often make
a

future

identification by relying on familiarity

rather than their original memory.

What seems to

be occurring is a blending of the witness's original
perception of the event, knowledge acquired prior
to the event, and inferences drawn after the event;
over time, information from these sources has been
integrated into a single memory

(Loftus, 1976).

M i s

identif ication is exacerbated further if the original
choice of the eyewitness is incorrect
tacher, and Sturgill,

(Brown, Deffen

19 77; Gorenstein and Ellsworth,

1980).
There are numerous factors which may affect the
accuracy of eyewitness identification when witnesses
are attempting to select a criminal from a lineup.
For example, Katz and Reid

(1977)

found that when

a witness had already pro\7lded police with a description
of the criminal and was later asked to identify the
suspect in a lineup, the witness sought a suspect
who fit his/her given description.

Therefore, an

unbiased lineup must be composed of potential suspects
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who each fit the witness's initial description of
the criminal.

Buckhout

(1976) has delineated three

factors to ensure an impartial lineup, arranging it
so that:
a.
b.

c.

all items have an equal chance of being
selected by a person who did not see
the suspect;
the items are similar enough to each
other and to the original description
of the suspect to be confusing to a
person who is merely guessing; and
the test is conducted without leading
questions or suggestions from the
test giver (p. 84).

A number of studies are illustrative of the poten
tial influence on witnesses of subtle suggestions
given by an interrogator.

Indeed, research has shown

that test or lineup administrators may "verbally,
nonverbally, or unconsciously" cue subjects in ways
which influence identification of the criminal
(Rosenthal, 1966).

For example, telling a witness

that the suspect "is in the lineup" resulted in an
increased number of misidentifications versus telling
witnesses that the suspect " may or may not be" in
the lineup

(Hall and Ostrom, cited in Wells, 1978).

If the identification procedure is conducted by an
authority figure, such as the police, subjects are
particularly likely to be influenced by suggestive
procedures

(Milgram, 1963).

Subjects more frequently

attempt identifications in the presence of authority
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figures,

even if they are inaccurate.

are shown a series of photographs,

If witnesses

some of which are

mugshots and some of which are not, witnesses will
more frequently choose one of the mugshots as the
suspect.

In addition, Buckhout

(1974) provrded witnesses

one of two layouts of photographs;

a biased spread,

where the suspect's head is tilted, he is grinning,
and the photograph itself is placed at an angle; and
an unbiased spread, where the attacker's photograph
is aligned with the others and shows a similar fullface view.

Under varying conditions,

the same suspect

was chosen significantly more frequently under the
biased condition.

Further,

if a person feels pressured

by social desirability or majority opinions,

s/he

may go along with a decision even if it is wrong

(Asch,

1955),
Recently, experts have been focusing on the "foils"
used in a lineup,
not suspects.

the persons in the lineup who are

The "functional size" of the lineup

is more important than the actual number of persons
employed in the lineup

(Lindsay and Wells, 1980; Wells,

Leippe, and Ostrom, 1979).

Functional size is deter

mined through the use of mock witnesses who view a
lineup after being given a simple description of the
suspect.

The functional size is then derived by a

formula:

the total number of mock witnesses asked
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to make an identification divided by the number of
eyewitnesses who choose the suspect (Fox, Note 1).
Functional size decreases as foils are increasingly
dissimilar from the suspect.

Conversely,

the function

al size of the lineup increases as foils more closely
resemble the suspect.

For example,

if the suspect

is described as a "short, heavy-set, older man", a
lineup consisting of a tall, slim, redhaired woman,
a young teenager, an elderly lady, and a five year
old child would yield a functional size of 1.0.

Con

versely, if all the foils in the lineup were short,
heavy-set, older men, the functional size would approx
imately equal the number of foils.

As the functional

size increases, so does the likelihood that a fair
lineup was conducted

(Fox, Note 1).

One identification procedure which is likely to
be extremely biased is the "showup", with a functional
size of 1.0.

In the showup, a police officer

(most

frequently) presents only the suspect to the eyewitness
for identification, and s/he is expected to respond
"yes" or "no" as to whether that person is the criminal.
Katz and Reid

(1977)

stated that during a showup,

the witness assumes that the subject is the prime
suspect.

Researchers agree that under such circumstances,

a witness is apt to cast aside his or her doubts about
the suspect’s identity, preferring to trust the judgment
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of the police officer who identified him or her and
who the witness may subconsciously wish to please
or fear disagreeing with
Reid,

(Buckhout, 1976; Katz and

1977).

"Retroactive inhibition" as a phenomenon affecting
eyewitness testimony has been well-documented in the
psychological literature.

Essentially, as the time

elapsed between an observation of an incident and
its recall increases, memory for the event decreases.
Buckhout

(19 74)

found that observers reproduced an

original drawing with decreasing accuracy at immediate,
one month and three month intervalsEgan, Pittner, and Goldstein

More specifically,

(1977) found that mistaken

identifications by eyewitnesses increased in number
(from 48 percent to 62 percent to 93 percent)

as the

crime-identification interval increased from two days
to 21 days to 56 days.
(1981)

Similarly, Courtois and Muellar

showed significant decreases in correct identifi

cations by subjects as the interval increased

(from

one minute to two days to 28 days) between viewing
photographs and re—viewing photograph arrays with
distractors.

Shepard

(1967) demonstrated a decrease

from 100 percent correct picture recognition after
a two-hour delay to 57 percent correct picture recog
nition after four months

(guessing would have yielded
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50 percent correct).
While many of the most pertinent psychological
factors which affect eyewitness testimony have been
reviewed here, it should be noted that there are numerous
additional well-documented factors.

Such factors

as the attractiveness of the suspect, needs and motives
of the witness, cross— racial identifications, the
effects of alcohol,

the physical condition of the

eyewitness, personal biases, perceived significance
of the witnessed event, expectancies of the eyewitness,
e t c ., also influence the accuracy of eyewitness testi
mony.

One might wonder how jurors' decisions would

be affected if they were made aware of these factors
which cast considerable doubt on the reliability of
eyewitness testimony.
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Memory
A complete, comprehensive review of the literature
and research on memory has been presented recently by
Wickelgren
herein.

(1981) and, therefore, will not be included

Rather, a description of the hypothetical

stages of memory, distortions and inaccuracies of
memory, and a brief discussion of several theoretical
models of memory follow.
Often the issue of identification accuracy is
sufficient to decide a case in that if a witness's
memory is correct,

then the defendant is undoubtedly

guilty.

Yet memory is imperfect and quite malleable

(Loftus,

1980).

Distortions of memory may occur at

any basic hypothetical "stage" of memory or within
one of the proposed basic "types" of memory.
(1979)

Yarmey

has divided the memory process into three

theoretical stages:
term memory, and

(1) sensory memory,

(3) long-term memory.

includes the initial rapid,

(2) short
Sensory memory

superficial information

processing that occurs within a fraction of a second.
A select part of this information is further processed
at the next stage of memory,

short-term, while the

remainder becomes quickly lost through the process of
decay or is replaced by attention to novel stimuli.
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If information in short-term memory is rehearsed within
the first thirty seconds, it is transferred to long-term
memory.

Unrehearsed information is lost, and some

additional loss may occur during the transfer to long
term storage.
memory,

Once information is stored in long-term

it is vulnerable to loss over time or to dis

tortion by subsequently occurring events.

The theoretical

dimensions of long-term memory include an infinite
capacity for storage and lifetime duration.
Most authors

(e.g., Loftus, 1979; Yarmey, 1979;

Wickelgren, 1981) divide the memory process into three
separate stages:
retention, and

(1) acquisition

(3) retrieval.

(or encoding),

(2)

During acquisition,

physical stimuli are encoded into memory.

Next, during

the retention stage, the coded information is system
atized and stored.

Finally, during the retrieval process,

the material is recalled from storage and transferred to
short-term memory for utilization.
A commonly held belief among both professionals and
laypersons is the view that memory functions like a
videotape recorder, permanently recording and storing
events as they occur.

Historically,

this model has been

supported by work done by Penfield during the 1 9 4 0's
using electrical stimulation while operating on the
brains of epileptics to produce recall of forgotten
events.

Both Penfield*s research and the videotape
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Penfield's

reports demonstrated spontaneous memory recall in only
3.5% of his patients, and there is reason to believe
that even these cases involved reconstructions or in
ferences and not actual memories
198 0).

(Loftus and Loftus,

In regard to the videotape recorder model of

memory, Wickelgren

(1981)

stated that "we can confidently

assert that this nonassociative theory
recorder model]

of LTM is false."

evidence, Loftus and Loftus

[videotape

Despite such contrary

(1980)

recently found that

84 percent of psychologists surveyed and 69 percent of
laymen surveyed agreed that "everything we learn is
permanently stored in the mind."
For over a decade, the videotape recorder model of
memory has been supported through the use of hypnosis
to retrieve details of permanently stored memories
(Cheek and LeCron,

1968).

However, recent research

contradicts this model on several bases.

Hypnosis is

an interpersonal relationship between the therapist
and the subject which demands that the subject behave
in a way that is pleasing to the hypnotist
1979; Watkins, 1982);
more willing,

therefore,

(Hilgard,

the subject may be

rather than more able, to report the

recollection of past events.

Highly suggestible

subjects often provide responses desired by the hypnotist
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even when prior instructions were to the contrary
(Watkins, 1982),

This "transference" between the

hypnotist and subject can have a determining effect
on the responses elicited

(Watkins, 1982).

Experiments

have shown that subjects under hypnosis will confidently
recall events not only from the past, but from the
future as well

(Kline, 19 58; Rubenstein and Newman,

1954); and that hypnosis may irreversibly alter one's
memory

(Hilgard and Loftus,

1979; Loftus,

1979).

Putnam

(19 79) recently completed research which suggests that
hypnotized subjects are more vulnerable to distortion
of memories generated by leading questions than are
nonhypnotized subjects.
Misleading questions and other events occurring
subsequent to the target event may actually produce a
change in the stored memory.

Loftus

(1975) demonstrated

that if a subject is asked a question which presupposes
the existence of a nonexistent object, that object may
become merged with the actual memory of the event.

In

this study, subjects viewed a film showing a car traveling
on a country road.

Later, when subjects were asked a

leading question about how fast the car was traveling
when it passed the barn, seventeen percent claimed to
have seen a barn; however, only three percent of the
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Other

misleading questions pertaining to an object actually
present in the scene may lead to distortion of color
or type;

for example, asking about the red car when

the color of the viewed car was actually green

(Loftus,

1977; Loftus, Miller and Burns, 1978).
Loftus and Zanni

(1975) demonstrated that the

phrasing of the interrogation can strongly influence
stored memory.

Questions asked of subjects regarding

nonexistent objects which included the word the

(Did

you see the broken headlight?) were significantly more
likely to elicit "recognition" responses than the same
question phrased with the word "a"
broken headlight?),

(Did you see a

Loftus and Palmer

(1974) had

subjects view a film and subsequently estimate the
speed a car was traveling in the film.

Those subjects

who were asked how fast the cars were traveling when
they smashed each other provided significantly higher
speed estimates and increased reports of broken glass
(although there was no broken glass in the film) than
subjects who were asked how fast the cars were going
when the hit each other.
The above-mentioned research and a series of studies
done by Loftus and her colleagues

(1975, 1977, 1978) have
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clearly demonstrated that stored memory may be distorted
by later events, leading psychologists to support the
"reconstructive" model of memory, which explains the
propensity for originally stored information to differ
from recalled information.

In an experiment involving

a stop sign where the subject is subsequently asked a
misleading question implying that they had viewed a
"yield" sign, subjects reported seeing what they were
told they saw

(the yield sign)

actually saw (the stop sign).
two slides simultaneously

rather than what they
Even when confronted with

(on halves of the same screen),

one being the actual slide containing the stop sign and
the other containing the yield sign (what the subject
was told s/he saw), subjects reported that they had
seen the yield sign.
The "supplementation of nothing" hypothesis states
that the subject may simply fail to store information
about the critical object

(e.g., the stop sign)

at the

time of the original viewing, and the postperceptual
distortion results from adding the misleading informa
tion to memory, providing the basis for the subsequent
report.

This theory has been rejected by research which

has demonstrated that immediately after a viewing, over
90% of subjects tested correctly identified the sign
they had seen.

A second coexistence or permanence
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hypothesis suggests that the information acquired postperceptually is added to the memory and coexists with
the original information.

This theory has been difficult

to refute but attempts to recover the original informa
tion once it has been tampered with have failed.
and Loftus*

Loftus

(1980) research tested this hypothesis exper

imentally and they concluded that "... the pattern of
responses ... suggests that the subjects had completely
lost the original information...".

These and results of

other studies suggest that substitution has occurred,
where the misleading information has irrevocably replaced
the original memory.

Loftus and Loftus

(198 0) have

convincingly demonstrated that there is evidence to
support the "substitution" hypothesis.

It is therefore

reasonable to believe that memory is not necessarily
permanent.
However, two very recent studies suggest that the
coexistence hypothesis should not be so readily dis
missed,

Anton

(Note 3) completed a partial replication

of one of Loftus*

second guess experiments using mis

leading information which had provided support for the
substitution hypothesis of memory.
jects*

He found that sub

second guesses revealed that the original information

about the critical item had been retained in memory, a
finding that is inconsistent with the substitution
hypothesis.

Using the same stop sign/yield sign sequence.
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Bekerian and Bowers

(1983) also found strong support

for the coexistence hypothesis using similar methodology.
Bekerian and Bowers attribute their results to having
increased the number of cues in the retrieval environ
ment and point out that in Loftus*

second-guess exper

iments, no additional cues relevant to the original
encoding were given to subjects between their first
and second responses.
Wells and Lindsay

(1983) have provided a "metamemory

theory", a complex analysis explaining the types of infor
mation used by people to infer the accuracy of another
person's memory.

For their purposes, metamemory is

defined as the individual's knowledge of and awareness
of memory or of anything pertinent to information storage
and retrieval.

It is postulated that three types of

information are used to judge the accuracy of another
person's memory.
The first is conditional information, which includes
information from "self-based judgments"
remembered under those conditions?)
information or expert opinions.

(would I have

and sample-based

While the latter type

of information may not be optimally utilized, Loftus
(1980) has shown that people do use it at least at some
1eve1.
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The second type of information used is intra- and
inter-subjective agreement information.

Intrasubjective

disagreement is defined as the lack of consistency in
one's report of his/her memory of an event.

Lack of

intrasubjective agreement has a significant discrediting
effect which goes beyond the inconsistent i t em (s) to
produce a more general discrediting effect of the person
and his/her memory for the entire event.
Leippe

(1981)

Wells and

showed that if an eyewitness changes even

a trivial detail of his or her report, that person would
subsequently be judged less likely to have accurately
identified the accused from a lineup.

Intersubjective

agreement, referring to the consistency of memorial
accounts between two or more witnesses,

is a rational

process of inference used by a memory judge.

However,

it can be distorted by conditional information which
favors one witness over another.

Also,

two or more

witnesses may be subject to the same error; for example,
overestimating and agreeing upon the duration of an
event.

Wells and Leippe

(1981) explored a subset of

intersubjective disagreement and found that witnesses
who erred in regard to peripheral detail of a scene or
event were discredited by the memory judge, even though
they were ultimately less likely to make a false identi
fication in the lineup - they were perceived as if the
opposite were true.
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The third type of information used by a memory
judge is response-bias information.

Response bias

refers to the tendency of a witness to report s/he
has remembered something without regard for the strength
of the memory trace.

For example, an eyewitness making

an identification from a lineup may have a response bias
to choose a member of the lineup and to do so in spite
of low certainty.

Wells and Lindsay

(1983)

suggest

that confidence might be construed as only a subset of
a broader phenomenon, merely providing an avenue for
the memory judge to discern the existence of a response
bias.
In a similar vein,

it has been shown that a person

who has previously made a free admission of memory
failure is accorded greater credibility on some other
memory item (Wells and Leippe, 1981).

It seems that

this communicates to the memory judge that the person
is not likely to fabricate a response, i.e., is not
operating with a response bias.

Further, a witness

with high confidence in his/her memory tells the memory
judge that his/her memory trace exceeds a certain high
criterion.

However, a witness who expresses low con

fidence tells the memory judge that had a higher
criterion for reporting been applied, the memory might
not have been reported? the memory judge may then infer
that there is a response bias to report a memory despite
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its weak trace.
More specifically, those eyewitnesses who consistently
(i.e., on every cross-examination question)

show high

confidence in response to every probe of their memory
are not believed, but are judged to have a bias to
respond with confidence
themselves).

A witness'

explicitly stated;

(e.g., are seen as "too sure" of
confidence does not have to be

rather, it is communicated through

both verbal and nonverbal channels.

One of the most

consistent factors judged is the application of verbal
qualifiers in an eyewitness's report of a memory.
qualifiers,

Verbal

such as "I think ..." or "I guess ..." or

"It must have been ...", signal the memory judge that a
process labeled "constructive invocation"

is in use;

this tells the judge that the memory reporter is utilizing
reconstructive memory and that, therefore, the reporter
has a response bias toward providing an answer even if it
is not truly remembered.
Clearly, then the concept of memory as a pure, passive,
and permanent process must be reconsidered.

Instead,

memory must be reconceptualized as an active process that
is both fallible and sensitive to a variety of external
influences which render it inaccurate and subject to
distortion at times.

As psychologists closely examine

memory processes and become increasingly aware of the
intricacies involved therein, they move further and
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further away from the prevalent view of the brain as
a permanent and accurate videotape recorder.

As a

result, this knowledge has serious implications for
police work and the processes used by our judicial
sy s tern.
It has become increasingly common for attorneys
to procure expert witnesses to educate jurors in regard
to the strengths and weaknesses of human memory,
depending on which side of the adversarial system one
might stand.

As experts become pitted against experts,

jurors will have an increasingly difficult time drawing
culpability conclusions.

How jurors react and wade

through the quagmire of facts they are bombarded with
has important implications for the future of the use
of eyewitness testimony, presently so heavily relied
u p o n , and for the functioning of the entire legal system,
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Confidence
Recent research in the area of eyewitness testimony
has focused on the confidence of the eyewitness.

Studies

have shown that subject-jurors are as likely to believe
an inaccurate eyewitness as they are to believe an
accurate one

(Lindsay, Wells, and Rumpel, 1981; Wells,

Lindsay and Ferguson,

1979; Wells, Lindsay and Tousignant,

1980; Wells, Ferguson and Lindsay,

1981),

Jurors con

sistently tended to overbelieve eyewitnesses in such
studies, their belief being highly correlated with the
confidence of the witness
et al.,

1979, Wells,

(Lindsay, et al., 1981; Wells,

et al., 1980).

Specifically,

research suggests that as much as fifty percent of
the variance in the jurors* choice to believe an eye
witness can be accounted for by the confidence of the
eyewitness

(Wells, et al., 1979).

(cited in Wells, et al.,

1980)

For example, Hastie

subjected jury deliber

ation videotapes to an analysis of eyewitness identi
fication remarks and found that most jurors assumed
that high confidence by the eyewitness implied accuracy.
The judicial system itself relies upon eyewitness
confidence to evaluate witness credibility.
V.

Biggers

In Neil

(1972), a landmark United States Supreme

Court case, the jurors assumed and the Court insisted
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that eyewitness confidence is a highly reliable cue to
determine witness credibility.

However, the relation

ship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy has
not been supported by research.

Wells, et al.,

(1979)

propose that more than ninety percent of the variance
in eyewitness confidence can be accounted for by factors
other than eyewitness accuracy.

Although the confidence-

accuracy relationship has at times been shown to be
positive

(Lipton, 1977; Wells, et al., 1979), it has

more often been found to be unrelated or even negative
(Buckhout, 1979; Loftus, Miller and Burns,
W e l l s , and Ostrom,

1978; Yarmey, 1979),

1978; Leippe,

In a compre

hensive review of such studies, Deffenbacher

(1980)

concluded that about half of the studies found a positive
but modest confidence-accuracy correlation, and half
noted a zero or negative correlation.

Deffenbacher

(198 0) suggests that under conditions not conducive
to forming an accurate memory

(reviewed earlier),

the relationship between confidence and accuracy is
near zero.

Further, the "significant" relationships

between accuracy and confidence are often modest, at
most

(r = .20 to r^ = .40).
The familiarity or novelty of a task has been shown

to effect the confidence-accuracy relationship.
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(1977)

found no relationship

between confidence and accuracy on a novel task, while
subjects* confidence was significantly related to
accuracy on a familiar task.

It has been suggested

that criminal identification usually involves a novel
experience, described as a single exposure to a novel
stimulus and subsequent subjection to a recognition
test

(Wells, et a l . , 1979).

Therefore, they predict

that novel encounters such as criminal identification
will result in a poor accuracy-confidence rleationship.
Similarly, Leippe

(1980)

found that as viewing condi

tions became less optimal, the accuracy-confidence
relationship became nonexistent; and hypothesized that
both reconstructive memory processes and social in
fluences markedly affect such a relationship.
as Deffenbacher

(1980) concludes,

Therefore,

the judicial system

should cease its reliance upon eyewitness confidence
as an index of eyewitness accuracy.
Perhaps more importantly,

studies suggest that the

accuracy-confidence relationship can be readily influenced
by certain legal procedures.

Specifically,

it has been

shown that witness' confidence in a false memory can
easily be enahnced by a common legal procedure used
by attorneys known as "briefing"
Wells, et al.

(Wells, et a l . , 1981).

(1981) briefed half their eyewitnesses in
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a manner which closely parallels the tactic of briefing
used by attorneys.

Eyewitnesses were instructed to

rehearse their testimony, were given sample questions in
preparation for cross-examination, and were warned that
cross-examiners would be probing for inconsistencies in
their testimony.

The briefed eyewitnesses rated them

selves as more confident than the eyewitnesses who were
not briefed; the majority of the increase in confidence
was attributed to inaccurate eyewitnesses increasing
their confidence.

Subject-jurors judged briefed eye

witnesses as more confident than non-briefed eyewitnesses.
The confidence-accuracy correlation was essentially
eliminated for briefed witnesses, but a small relation
ship was found for non-briefed witnesses.

More importantly,

greater belief was given to the briefed eyewitness's
testimony, which corresponded with an increase in guilty
votes.

Thus, eyewitness confidence is m o re than just a

correlate of the extent to which jurors believe the
eyewitness;

increasing the witness's expressed confidence

actually increased the juror's reliance upon their
testimony

{Wells, et a l . , 1981).

Techniques such as

briefing, both commonly employed and openly advocated
in the legal system, make inaccurate witnesses more
confident in their testimony.

As a result, jurors

overbelieve inaccurate eyewitnesses

(Wells, et al., 1981).
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Wells, Lindsay and Tousignant
cation of another study
1981),

(1980), in a repli

(Lindsay, Wells, and Rumpl,

instructed subject-jurors to ignore the eye

witness's confidence because it has not proven to be
a reliable indicator of eyewitness accuracy.

Subject-

jurors who were not told to ignore witness confidence
were unable to distinguish between accurate-identifi
cation and false— identification witnesses, displayed
the tendency to overbelieve eyewitnesses under poor
witnessing conditions, and showed some adjustment in
belief rates according to the witnessing conditions.
Subject-jurors who were told to ignore confidence also
showed no ability to distinguish between accurateidentification and false-identification eyewitnesses;
they did no better in taking witnessing conditions
into account.

However,

they did greatly reduce their

belief in eyewitness testimony,
advice to ignore confidence)

from 61.5%

to 40.5%

(with no

(with advice).

Further, in marked contrast to control

(no advice)

group

results, high-confidence eyewitnesses were no more likely
to be believed than were low-confidence eyewitnesses.
Thus, while it is possible to lessen the jurors' degree
of reliance on eyewitness confidence, this in itself
will not make them better judges of eyewitness accuracy
(Wells, Lindsay, and Tousignant, 1980).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

page

38

The findings that suggest that jurors are strongly
affected by the confidence of the eyewitness and that
accuracy and confidence do not correspond, presenting
serious problems and challenges for the judicial system
as it functions today.

However, recent research indicates

that expert testimony focusing on the unreliability of
eyewitness identification, or similar instructions
presented to jurors by a judge, may mitigate the impact
of eyewitness confidence and lessen jurors* tendencies
to overbelieve eyewitnesses.

Unfortunately, this is

likely to result in attorneys pitting expert against
expert, resulting in confusion to jurors and unknown
consequences in regard to the fairness of verdicts.
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Several recent studies have examined the impact of
expert psychological testimony on jurors' decision
(Hosch, Beck and McIntyre,
Lindsay and Tousignant,

1980; Loftus, 1980b; Wells,

1980; Fox

(Note 1)).

The

results consistently demonstrate that subject-jurors
are significantly influenced by hearing expert testi
mony on eyewitness identification.
The first studies conducted in the area were done by
Loftus

(1980b).

In a pair of experiments, she presented

subject-jurors with written summaries of an assault case,
half of which included expert testimony and half did not.
The results of the first study showed that expert testi
mony significantly reduced the percentage of individuallyreached guilty verdicts from 57.5% to 39%.

In the second

study, it was found that when deliberating to reach a
verdict,

juries whose summaries included expert testimony

spent significantly more time discussing the eyewitness*
accounts than did those juries whose summaries did not
include expert testimony.

This result suggests that

presenting psychological expert testimony on the unrelia
bility of eeyewitness testimony may increase the amount
of attention jurors pay to eyewitness accounts, perhaps
increasing scrutinization of such testimony.

In addition,

juries whose summaries contained expert testimony con
victed the defendant less frequently.
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investigated the

effects of expert testimony first on community resident
subjects who served as jurors in a reenacted courtroom
trial; and secondly on college student juries who
viewed a videotape of the same court proceedings.

Both

groups viewed a burglary case trial in which the eyewit
ness identified the defendant as the criminal.

Half of

the subjects in each sample subsequently heard the ex
pert testimony of a psychologist.

While there were no

significant differences between the community resident
verdicts and those of college-student juries, subjects
who heard the expert psychological testimony placed
less importance on eyewitness testimony in reaching
their decision and spent more time examining all of
the evidence that was presented in the case.
Wells, Lindsay and Tousignant

(1980) presented

subjects with a videotape of expert psychological testimong prior to exposing them to a videotapes cross-exam
ination of an eyewitness.

The eyewitnesses had previously

witnessed a staged theft under poor, moderate, or good
visibility conditions and had been asked to make an
identification;

they were either accurate or inaccurate.

The expert testimony was found to significantly reduce
the subjects'

tendency to rely heavily on eyewitness

confidence; belief of accurate witnesses was reduced
bv 18% and belief of inaccurate witnesses was reduced
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Expert psychological testimony essentially

eliminated jurors'

overbelief tendencies,

although

it did lead to some "underbelief" of accurate witnesses.
While only the handful of studies cited above have
been completed in this area, it is certain from the
results that expert psychological testimony may signif
icantly impact the weight and credibility the juror
assigns to eyewitness testimony.

Psychologists gen

erally agree that their role as experts should focus
on the provision of scientific knowledge to facilitate
and increase the accuracy of a juror's verdict.

While

the testimony offered in some studies has included
case-relevant factors, most psychologists believe that
expert testimony should not offer jurors post hoc
probabilities of an eyewitness's credibility or accuracy
in a particular case
Wells,

{Loftus,

et a l . , 1980; Woocher,

1980b; Hosch, et al., 1980;
1977).

However, there is some controversy surrounding the
issues of how relevant the expert psychological testimony
should be to the instant case.
(Woocher, 1977)

It has been suggested

that expert psychological testimony

should provide jurors the scientific knowledge necessary
for evaluating the eyewitness evidence by tailoring
their responses to the facts of the case at hand.
accordance with this advice, both the Loftus
Hosch,

et a l . , (1980)

In

(1980b)

and

studies included "relevant ractors"
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{1980} research

testified on the relevant factors of duration of the event
and stress; and offered an opinion on a hypothetical case
which so closely paralleled the facts of the instant case
that he bordered on offering an opinion in the case.
expert in the Loftus

(1980b)

The

study testified on the

relevant factors of cross-racial identification, stress,
weapon focus, and alcohol.
(1980)

In contrast. Wells, et al.,

argues that a more general form of expert testimony

is more time and cost-efficient than relevant factors
expert testimony.
(1980b)

Accordingly,

the expert in the Loftus

study focused only on the general unreliability

of using eyewitness confidence to assess accuracy, and
instead advised a strategy of focusing on the situational
factors that the eyewitness reports; and testified on
the fallibility of accurately choosing a defendant from
a lineup.
One study

(Fox, Note 1) compared the effects of

"general" expert testimony with "relevant factors"
testimony, and also manipulated the variable of eyewitness
confidence.

Results of his study showed that both

"general" and "relevant factors" expert testimony
significantly reduced guilt ratings, and also decreased
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the subject-jurors' belief that the eyewitness had
accurately identified the gunman.

While "relevant

factors" testimony reduced guilt ratings and the belief
that the eyewitness

had correctly identified the gunman

more than "general" expert testimony, the differences
were not statistically significant.
jurors'

Although subject-

reliance on eyewitness confidence as an indicator

of eyewitness accuracy was significantly reduced by the
expert testimony, it did not totally eliminate the subjectjurors'

tendency to believe the high-confidence witness

more than the low— confidence eyewitness.
In a very recent study, Weisser
partial replication of Fox's

(Note 2), in a

(note 1) research, explored

the effects of both general and relevant factors expert
testimony and expert testimony given to jurors in the
form of judge's instructions.

Although he used

equivalent methodology to the Fox

(Note 1) study,

results of his study failed to replicate the previous
findings in that the majority of subjects in all con
ditions believed the eyewitness had identified an
innocent person.

The use of judge's instructions to

convey psychological research results concerning the
unreliability of eyewitness identification was found
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to be as effective as the use of a psychologist giving
expert

(general or relevant factors)

testimony.

The present study compared the effects of relevant
factors psychological expert testimony to relevant
factors expert testimony plus opposing psychological
expert testimony to a control
condition.

(no expert testimony)

Relevant factors expert testimony was used

here because it has been shown to be more effective
than general expert testimony

(Fox, Note 1), and would

be better suited for rebuttal by another expert psych
ologist hired by opposing counsel in an actual court
case.

As was done in the Fox

Hosch, et al.

(Note 1), Loftus

(1980), and Weisser

(1980b),

(Note 2) studies, the

expert testimony was presented following the eyewitness
testimony,

as this is the order used most frequently

in the actual courtroom setting.
The eyewitness videotapes and one of the psychologist
expert testimony videotapes were the same as those used
by Fox

(Note 1) and Weisser

(Note 2).

These tapes have

been rated by subject-jurors as very realistic and their
use facilitated this second replication in a series of
expert testimony studies.

This was the first known study

to simulate the adversarial use of psychologists providing
expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness iden
tification,

Hypotheses were non-directional due to the

exploratory nature of the study.
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CHAPTER II
METHODS
Design
A 3 X 2 X 2 factoral design was used in this study.
The factor of "eyewitness confidence" during testimony
had two levels

(high confidence vs. low confidence).

The "expert testimony" variable had three levels:
no expert testimony

(control)

the

condition, relevant

factors expert testimony only condition, and the
relevant factors expert testimony plus opposing expert
testimony condition.
two levels

The sex of subject variable had

(male and female).

Subjects were randomly

assigned to serve in one of the six conditions, with
twenty

(20) subjects, including ten

(10) males and ten

(10) females, in each experimental condition.

The

design utilized, exclusive of the sex factor, is shown
diagrammatically below:
Eyewitness Confidence
Low Confidence
Control

(no expert testimony)

High Confidence

n = 20

n = 20

Relevant Factors Expert
Testimony Only

n = 20

n = 20

Relevant Factors Expert
Testimony Plus Opposing
Expert Testimony

n=20

n = 20

45
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Subjects
One—hundred twenty

(sixty male and sixty female)

introductory psychology student at the University of
Montana volunteered to serve as subjects.

Each

received course credit for participation in the
experiment.
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Data Analysis
Analysis of variance was performed on the dependent
measures employing Likert-type scales.

When significant

main effects were found for the expert testimony factor
or when significant interaction effects were found,
Newman-Keuls tests were subsequently performed, allowing
for pairwise comparisons among the cells.

For the

single dichotomous question, the gunman versus innocent
person decision, the chi-square test was performed.
When significant results were found for the level of
expert testimony factor, then Bonferroni tests, which
allowed for comparisons among individual cells involved
in the chi-square test, were subsequently performed.
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Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the six
experimental conditions.

Small group videotape viewing

sessions were conducted at the Clinical Psychology Center
on the University of Montana campus.

Each session was

conducted by an undergraduate psychology student who was
blind to the experimental hypotheses.

Subjects first

received a written introduction to the eyewitness videotape
(see Appendix 6) which provided information about the pur
pose of the study, facts pertinent to the crime being tried,
and important points made in the defendant's previous
testimony.
After subjects completed reading this brief introduction,
subjects viewed one of the eyewitness testimony (high or low
confidence) videotapes.

Subsequently, subjects in the two

control conditions completed a cover sheet (age, sex, year
in college) and the dependent measures, since this was the
only videotape they viewed.

Participants in the expert

testimony conditions and in the expert plus opposing expert
testimony conditions were given, additionally, a written
introduction to the expert testimony videotape (see
Appendices 7 and 8) describing the experience and expertise
of the testifying psychologist.

Subjects in the expert

plus opposing expert testimony condition then read a third
introduction prior to viewing the opposing expert videotape.
After completing the videotape viewings, subjects in the
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completed the dependent measures.
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Eyewitness Testimony Videotapes
Common Characteristics of Eyewitness Videotapes
Both eyewitness videotapes were the same as those used
by Fox

(Note 1) and Weisser

(Note 2).

Both tapes pertain to

the same crime, the robbery of a 7—11 convenience store and
the murder of the store's clerk

(see Appendices 1 and 2).

The eyewitness to the crime, who was also the store manager,
was working in the stockroom at the back of the store when
he heard an argument and then a gunshot.

He ran to the

front of the store and saw two robbers emptying the cash
register, and another holding a gun; his store clerk was
lying on the floor, motionless.

The gunman yelled to the

other robbers to leave the store and then fired a shot at
the eyewitness which narrowly missed.

All three criminals

ran out of the store, the gunman stumbling on his way out,
and down the street to a car parked out of sight.

The

eyewitness briefly turned his attention to the murdered
clerk prior to telephoning the police.

He provided the

police with a description of the crime sequence and the
gunman.

After a month, the eyewitness identified the

defendant as the gunman at a one-on-one "showup" at the
police station jail cell.
In both videotapes, the prosecution initially interro
gated the eyewitness with simple, straightforward questions.
Subsequently, the eyewitness was questioned by the defense
attorney in a more challenging and confrontive tone which
required more explicit and detailed answers.
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(See Appendix 1)

In the low confidence videotape,

the eyewitness was

hesitant, uncertain, and inconsistent in his testimony.
The witness conveyed a marked lack of confidence through
the use of verbal qualifiers

("I guess....", "i think....",

"If I'm not mistaken ...."), which have been shown
empirically to portray low confidence
1982) .

(Wells and Lindsay,

To further illustrate low confidence,

the script

for this videotape was written to include questioning
forms

(rising intonation at the end of declarative

statements)

and hesitation forms

(e.g., "uh", "well",

"you know") which have been shown to communicate a
"powerless" style of speech

(Erickson, Lind, Johnson,

and O 'Barr, 1978).
High Confidence Videotape

(See Appendix 2)

In the high confidence videotape

(the same male

actor used in the low confidence videotape), the eyewit
ness was confident,
testimony.

self-assured, and consistent in his

He used phrases which expressed his certainty,

such as "I'm sure...",
never forget.,.",

"I'm certain...", and "I could

instead of verbal qualifiers which

communicated low confidence.

His responses to question

ing were straightforward and he confidently identified
the defendant as the gunman.
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Expert Testimony Videotapes
Relevant Factors Expert Testimony

(See Appendix 3)

The videotape was the same as that used in the Fox
(Note 1) and Weisser

(Note 2) studies, and was origin

ally derived from Wells, Linsday and Tousignant

(198 0).

In this tape, the psychologist discussed twelve specific
factors affecting eyewitness perception and memory that
were highly relevant to the case being tried.

These

twelve factors are highlighted below:
1.

"Physical" factors affecting eyewitness performance,

such as distance of eyewitness from the criminal,
lighting conditions, and the effects of rapid movements;
2.

Length of observation of the criminal during the

crime?
3.

Length of time between witnessing a crime and recall

of identification of the criminal;
4.

Stress effects;

5.

Tendency of eyewitness to overestimate the duration

of a crime;
6.

"Weapon focus",

the presence of a weapon has

distracting effects on the eyewitness;
7.

Negative effects of a violent or emotionally loaded

incident;
8.

Effects of the number of criminals involved in the

crime;
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9.

Uniqueness vs. typicality of the criminal's face;

10.

"Unconscious transference", where a person seen in

one situation is confused with and recalled as a person
seen in a second situation;
11. Effects of a biased lineup or "showup"; and
12. Effects of police pressure on an eyewitness.
The psychologist's testimony ended by summarizing some
general aspects of eyewitness testimony and by providing
a review of the twelve relevant factors listed above.
The psychologist was first questioned by the defense
lawyer, and then interrogated by the prosecuting attorney.
Opposing Psychologist Expert Testimony

(See Appendix 4)

This videotape was similar to the Relevant Factors
Expert Testimony videotape except that the psychologist
provided specific factors affecting eyewitness perception
and memory that cast doubt on the expert testimony provided
by the first expert, and gave support to the notion that
eyewitness testimony is generally reliable and useful.
These factors included the following:
1.

Eyewitness accuracy and viewing conditions;

2.

Effects of eyewitness confidence;

3.

Generalizability of eyewitness research;

4.

Effects of staged crimes ;

5.

Procedural differences in identifications

(lineups

versus photo arrays);
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Effects of the use of college students as subject-

jurors;
7.

Need for additional research?

8.

Effects of using statistical averages to predict

eyewitness accuracy
9.

(ignoring individual differences);

Positive effects of stress;

10. Unknown effects of multiple factors affecting
eyewitness testimony?
11. "Weapon focus";
12. The effects of expert psychological testimony.
The psychologist’s testimony ended by summarizing and
reviewing the twelve opposing relevant factors concerning
research in the area of eyewitness and expert t e s t i m o n y
listed above.

The psychologist was only questioned by

the prosecuting attorney.
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(See Appendix 5)

A maximum of seventeen questions were employed as
dependent measures; eleven

questions for the control

condition^ fourteen questions for the expert testimony
only condition^ and seventeen questions for the expert
testimony plus opposing expert testimony condition.
First subjects were asked to indicate whether they
believed the witness had identified the gunman or
an innocent person using a dichotomous question
Ferguson, and Lindsay,
asked to rate

1981).

(Wells,

Subjects were subsequently

(1) how confident they were of that

decision on a ten-point Likert scale;

(2) the probability

of the defendant's guilt on a ten-point Likert scale ;
(3) how confident they thought the witness was in his
ability to identify the gunman; (4) what percentage of
people they would expect to make a correct identification
under the circumstances described by the eyewitness;
and

(5) to what extent they believed they could generally

tell from a witness's confidence in his testimony
whether or not the eyewitness made an accurate identifica
tion

(Wells, Lindsay, and Ferguson,

1979).

Subjects

were then asked to indicate on Likert-type scales
the percentage of eyewitness testimony in general
they thought was accurate
1980).

(Hosch, Beck, and McIntyre,

Additional ten-point Likert scale questions
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(Fox, Note 1; Weisser, Note 2) asked subjects to assess
how much they relied upon the eyewitness's description
of the crime, the eyewitness's confidence, and the
psychologist's or opposing psychologist's expert testi
mony in deciding whether they thought the eyewitness
had identified the gunman or an innocent person

(the

questions regarding expert testimony were not given
to the two control conditions),

Likert-scale questions

also asked subjects to rate the realism of the eyewitness
videotapes and the expert testmony videotapes (not
given to the two control conditions).

Subjects in

the expert testimony conditions were asked if they
recognized the psychologists and how much each psycholo
gist influenced his or her decision about whether
the eyewitness had identified the gunman or an innocent
person.

Finally, a question asked the subject-jurors

to describe in their own words how they decided that
the eyewitness had identified the gunman or an innocent
person

(Fox, Note 1; Weisser, Note 2).
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Gunman vs. Innocent Person Decision
65% of subjects assigned to the Control conditions
believed that the eyewitness accurately chose the gun
man; versus 15% of subjects exposed to relevant factors
Expert Testimony Only^ and 53% of subjects viewing
Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony videotapes.
4 2% of subjects exposed to the High Confidence
eyewitness conditions believed the eyewitness had
accurately identified the gunman, compared to 47% of
subjects who viewed the Low Confidence eyewitness.
The following table summarizes the percentage of
subjects in each condition who believed that the eye
witness accurately identified the gunman:
Table 1 : Percentage of Subjects in Each Condition Who
Believed the Eyewitness Accurately Identified the Gunman
(n = 20 in each cell)
High Confidence
Eyewitness
No Expert Testimony

(control)

Expert Testimony Only
Expert Testimony Plus
Opposing Expert Testimony

Low Confidence
Eyewitness

50%
15%
45%

57
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Chi squares were performed to test the null hypothesis
that there is no association between the subjects* exper
imental condition and the proportion of subjects who
hslieved the eyewitness had identified the gunman or an
innocent person.

Results of the chi square analysis

suggest that there is a dependence between subjects'
condition and who they identified.

More specifically,

in the Expert Plus Opposing Expert conditions, approx
imately equivalent numbers of subjects believed that
the eyewitness had identified the gunman and an innocent
person.

However, a larger proportion of subjects in the

Expert Only conditions believed the eyewitness had
identified the innocent person; while in the Control
conditions, the majority of subjects believed the eye
witness had identified the gunman.

The following 3 X 2

table summarizes these results:
Table 2: Chi Square Analysis - Condition by Gunman vs.
Innocent Person Decision
Gunman
No Expert Testimony

(control)

Expert Testimony Only
Expert Testimony Plus
Opposing Expert Testimony

26
6
21

Innocent Person
14
34
19

x^ = 21.97, df = 2, j g < . 0 5
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Because the chi square for Condition was significant,
subsequent chi square analyses were performed to determine
which Conditions differed significantly from each other
in regard to the gunman versus innocent person decision
and were tested at Bonferroni levels of significance.
The chi square tests revealed that there is a significant
difference between the Expert Only and the Expert Plus
Opposing Expert Testimony Conditions; and between the
Control

(No Expert Testimony)

and Expert Only Conditions.

The Control and Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony
Conditions did not differ significantly from each other.
The following 2 X 2

tables

(3, 4 and 5) summarize these

results :
Table 3: Chi Square Analysis - No Expert Testimony
(Control) and Expert Testimony Only Conditions by Gunman
versus Innocent Person decision

No Expert Testimony

(Control)

Expert Testimony Only
x^ = 20.83, d^ = 1 , 2

Gunman
26

Innocent Person
14

6

34

^ "05 Bonferroni

Table 4: Chi Square Analysis - No Expert Testimony
(Control) and Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony
Conditions by Gunman versus Innocent Person Decision
Gunman
No Expert Testimony (Control)
Expert Plus Opposing Expert

Innocent Person

26
21

x^ = 1.29, df = 1, p > .05 Bonferroni
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Table 5: Chi Square Analysis - Expert Testimony Only
and Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony Conditions
by Gunman versus Innocent Person Decision
Gunman
Expert Testimony Only
Expert Plus Opposing Expert
2 = 12.58, df = 1, 2

Innocent Person

6

34

21

19

-C.OS Bonferroni
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Another chi square analysis was performed to test
the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between
level of confidence

(high or low) of the eyewitness the

subjects viewed and whether they believed the eyewitness
had identified the gunman or an innocent person.

The

chi square results provide support for the null hypo
thesis.

The following 2 X 2

table summarizes these

results :
Table 6: Chi Square Analysis - Level of Confidence by
Gunman versus Innocent Person Decision
Gunman
25
28

Low Confidence
High Confidence

Innocent Person
35
32

= .30, d^ = 1, p > .05
An additional chi square was executed to test the
null hypothesis that there is no relationship between
the frequency of identifying the gunman or an innocent
person based upon the sex of subject.

The chi square

results provide support for the null hypothesis.
following 2 X 2

The

table summarizes these results:

Table
Chi Square Analysis - Sex of Subject by
Gunman versus Innocent Person Decision

Male Subjects
Female Subjects
X

Gunman

Innocent Person

31
22

29
38

= 2.74, df = 1, p > .05
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Decision Confidence
Subjects were asked to rate their confidence in
their decision as to whether the eyewitness identified
the gunman or an innocent person.

Mean scores on a

ten-point Likert scale for each of the twelve individual
groups are provided below in Table 8

(the higher the

score, the greater the level of decision confidence
indicated).

The mean confidence rating for the Control

conditions was 5,95; Expert Testimony Only conditions
was 6.83; Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony condi
tions was 6.15.

Subjects in the Low Confidence condi

tions obtained a mean confidence rating of 6.03; while
those in the High Confidence conditions reported a
mean confidence rating of 6.58.

Males reported a mean

confidence rating of 6.5, while females' mean confidence
rating was 6.12.

A 3 X 2 X 2

(condition by confidence

by sex of subject); analysis of variance revealed no

Table 8: Means for Each Group on Subjects' Ten-Point
Likert Scale Ratings of their Confidence in the Gunman
versus Innocent Person Decision (10 = absolutely con
fident, 1 = not at all confident)
Low Confidence
Eyewitness____
Female
Male
No Expert Testimony
Expert Testimony Only
Expert Testimony Plus
Opposing Expert
Testimony

5.0
7.4
6.4

High Confidence
Eyewitness_____
Female
Male

6.3

6.0

5.6

7.1

6.5
7.2

5.5

7.1

5.6
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Table 9: 3 X 2 X 2 Analysis of variance of ratings
of confidence on the gunman versus innocent person
decision
Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
F
Square

2
1
2
1
2
1
2

8.41
9.08
0.18
4.41
12.67
0. 21
5.66

Condition
16.82
Confidence
9. 08
Condition X Confidence
0. 35
Sex of Subject
4. 41
Condition X Sex of S
25. 32
0. 21
Confidence X Sex of S
11.32
Condition X Confidence
X Sex of Subject
480.10
Error

108

547.59

119

Total

Significance
of F

1 .89
2.04
0.04
0.99
2.85
0. 05
1. 27

.15
.15
.96
.68
.06
.82
.28

4.45

significant effects, although the Condition by Sex of
Subject interaction approached significance

(P = .06).

Table 9 provides the ANOVA data.
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Guilt
Subjects were asked to rate the probability of the
defendant's guilt on a ten—point Likert scale
definitely not guilty,

(1 =

10 = definitely guilty).

Mean

scores for each group are shown in Table 10. The mean
rating of guilt in the Control conditions was 5,63; in
the Expert Testimony Only conditions, the mean was
3.80; and the Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony
conditions reported a mean of 5.88.

Mean guilt rating

for subjects in the Low Confidence conditions was 5.15,
compared to 5.05 in the High Confidence conditions.
Mean guilt rating for Males was 5.43, while for Females
it was 4.77

(See Table 10).

A 3 X 2 X 2 analysis of

variance revealed a significant main effect for condi
tion.

See Table 11 for the ANOVA.

Subsequent Newman-

Keuls pairwise comparisons found that the Expert Only
groups' guilt rating

(X = 3.80, n = 40) differed signif

icantly from both the Control grups'

(X = 5.63, n = 40)

and Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony groups'
(X = 5.86, n = 40) guilt ratings, which did not differ
significantly from each other.

In addition, the main

effect for Sex of Subject

(jp = .0969) and the Condition

by Confidence interaction

(p = .0649)

approached signif

icance .
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Table 10: Means for each group on subjects' ten-point
Likert scale ratings of the probability of the defen
dant's guilt (1 = definitely not guilty, 10 = definitely
guilty
Low Confidence
Eyewitness
Male
Female
No Expert Testimony
Expert Testimony Only
Expert Plus Opposing
Expert Testimony

6.2
4.2

6.2

5.5

5.1

High Confidence
Eyewitness
Male
Female
5 .6
4.5

3.7

3 .8
7 .3

3.5
5.6

Table 11 : Analysis of variance of ratings of probability
of defendant's guilt
Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

Condition
102.65
.30
Confidence
27.05
Condition X Confidence
13.33
Sex of Subject
2.32
Condition X Sex of S
4.03
Confidence X Sex of S
3.32
Condition X Confidence
X Sex of Subject
525.80
Error
Total

678.80

df

Mean
F
Square

2
1
2
1
2
1
2

51.33
0.30
13. 53
13.33
1.16
4.03
1.66

Significance
of F

10.54
0.06
2.78
2.74
0.24
0.83
0.34

108
119
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Manipulation Check - Eyewitness Confidence Ratings
Subjects were asked to indicate on a ten-point
Likert scale how confident the eyewitness seemed to
be in his ability to identify the gunman
all confident,

(1 = not at

10 = definitely confident).

Mean

scores for each group are portrayed in Table 12.
The eyewitness was rated as significantly more confident
in the High Confidence conditions
the Low Confidence conditions

(X = 9.03)

(X = 4.75).

than in

Significant

differences between the two groups indicate that the
manipulation was effective.

A 3 X 2 X 2 analysis of

variance revealed a significant main effect for
Confidence and near significant Condition by Confidence
(£ = .053) and Confidence by Sex of Subject (£ = .069)
effects.
effects;

See Figures 1, 2 and 3 for the graphs of the
see Table 13 for the ANOVA.

Figure 1:
Graph of the effect of condition and confidence
for the manipulation check — eyewitness confidence ratings
10.0

9.0
8.5
8.0

_

'

^
#

--- High Confidence
7.5
7.0--------------------------------------- --- Low Confidence
6.5
6.0

5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
No Expert'Testimony

Expert Test. Only

Expert Plus
Opposing Expert
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Figure 2: Graph of the effect of condition and confidence
for the manipulation check - eyewitness confidence ratings
7.5
7.0
6.5

.

Males
Females

6 0

5.5
+ ■

No Expert
Testimony

Expert Testimony
Only

Expert Plus
Opposing Ex
pert Testimony

Table 12: Means for each group on subjects' ten-point
Likert scale ratings of the degree of confidence of the
eyewitness
Low Confidence
Eyewitness____
Male

Female

High Confidence
Eyewitness_____
Female
Male

No Expert Testimony

5.4

4.9

9.5

Expert Testimony Only

3.6

5.1

9.9

6.7
9.2

Expert Testimony Plus
Opposing Expert

4.9

4.6

9.5

9.4
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Table 13:
3 X 2 X 2
confidence ratings

analysis of variance of eyewitness

Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

df

Condition
4.72
Confidence
550.41
Condition X Confidence
27.92
Sex of Subject
7.01
Condition X Sex of S
22. 22
Confidence X Sex of S
15.41
Condition X Confidence
10,02
X Sex of Subject
Error
505.90

2
1
2
1
2
1
2

Total

119

1143.59

Mean
F
Square

Significaj
of F

2. 36
2.36
550.41 117.50
13.96
2.98
7.01
1.50
11.11
2.37
15.41
3.29
5.01
1, 07

.61158
.00001
.05344
.22165
.09616
.96893
.34775

108

Figure 3: Graph of the effect of confidence and sex of
subjects for the manipulation check — eyewitness confidence
ratings
10.0

9.5
9.0

Males
Females

8.5
8 .0
7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
High Confidence
Eyewitness

Low Confidence
Eyewitness
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Estimated General Percentages of Correct. Identifications
Subjects were asked to make estimates of the percentage
of people who would make a correct identification under
the circumstances described by the eyewitness on a 0% 100% scale.
group means.

Table

14 provides a summary of the individual

Subjects in the Control conditions gave mean

estimations of the percentage of people who would make a
correct identification under the circumstances described
of 51,25%, versus 32.75% in the Expert Only conditions,
and 49.8 0% in the Expert Plus Opposing Expert conditions.
Subjects in the Low Confidence conditions estimated that
45.5% of the population would make a correct identifica
tion under the given circumstances, versus 4 3.7% in the
High Confidence conditions.

Males' mean estimation was

54.33% compared to 34,87% for Females.

A 3 X 2 X 2

analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect
for Sex of Subject? Males gave significantly higher ratings
than did Females.

See Table

15 for the ANOVA.

An inter

action of condition by level of confidence indicates that
under the Control conditions, subjects exposed to the
High Confidence eyewitness gave smaller percentage estimates
of the people who would make a correct identification under
circumstances similar to those described by the eyewitness
compared to subjects exposed to the Low Confidence witness,
who gave higher percentage estimates of correct identifica-
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tions under similar circumstances.

In the Expert Only

conditions. High and Low Confidence groups differed only
slightly, and both provided low estimates of the per
centage of people who would make a correct identification
under the circumstances described.

In the Expert Plus

Opposing Expert Testimony conditions. High Confidence
groups gave higher estimates of the percentage of people
who would make a correct identification under the cir
cumstances described by the eyewitness than did Low
Confidence groups.

Subsequent Newman—Keuls pairwise

comparisons revealed that only the following specific
pairs of means differed significantly:

Low Confidence

Control differed significantly from High Confidence
Expert Only and Low Confidence Expert Only; High Con
fidence Expert Plus Opposing Expert differed significantly
from High Confidence and Low Confidence Expert Only con
ditions .
Table 14: Mean percentages for each group on subjects'
Likert— type estimations of the percentage of people who
would make a correct identification under the circum
stances described by the eyewitness

50%
25%

High Confidence
Eyewitness
Male
Female
30%
57%
24%
43%

37%

65%

Low Confidence
Eyewitness
No Expert Testimony
Expert Testimony Only
Expert Plus Opposing

Male
68%
39%
54%

Female
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Table 15:
3 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance of estimated
general percentage of correct identifications
Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
F
Square

Condition
8467.40
Confidence
97. 20
Condition X Confidence
3067.40
Sex of Subject
11368.50
Condition X Sex of S
180.07
Confidence X Sex of S
294.53
Condition X Confidence
28. 07
X Sex of Subject
Error
49501.60

2 4233.70
1
97.20
2 1533.70
1 11368.50
2
90. 03
1
294.53
2
14.03

Total

119

73004.80

Significanc
of F
9.24
.21
3.35
24.80
.20
.64
.03

.00040
.65101
.03773
.00003
.82368
.56980
.97036

10 8 458.35

Figure 4: Graph of interaction of condition and confidence
at estimated general percentage of correct identifications
60
50
40
30
No Expert
Testimony
(Control)

Expert
Testimony
Only

Expert Plus
Opposing
Expert Testimony

High Confidence
Low Confidence
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Belief in Eyewitness Confidence as an Indicator of Accuracy
Subjects were asked to indicate on a ten-point Likert
scale the extent to which one can tell from an eyewitness*
confidence whether or not the eyewitness made a correct
identification

{1 = can almost never tell if eyewitness

is accurate, 10 = can almost always tell if eyewitness is
accurate).

Subjects in the Control conditions reported a

mean rating of 5.95, compared to those in the Expert Only
conditions, with a mean rating of 4.35, and those in the
Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony condition, reporting
a mean rating of 5.83.

Subjects in the Low Confidence

conditions gave a mean rating of 5.4 5 versus 5.30 in the
High Confidence conditions.

Males mean rating of belief

in eyewitness confidence as an indicator of accuracy was
5.48, compared to 5.27 for Females.
means of the individual groups.

See Table 16

for the

A 3 X 2 X 2 analysis of

variance revealed a significant main effect for subjects'
condition.

Subsequent Newman-Keuls pairwise comparisons

indicated that there were no significant differences among
any pair of groups.

See Table 17

for the ANOVA.
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Table 16: Means for each groups on subjects* ten-point
Likert scale ratings of the extent to which eyewitness'
confidence can be used to infer eyewitness accuracy
(1 = can almost never tell if eyewitness is accurate,
10 = can almost always tell if eyewitness is accurate)
Low Confidence
Eyewitness____
Male
Female
No Expert Testimony

5.90

6.10

Expert Testimony Only
Expert Plus Opposing
Expert Testimony

4.30

5.10

5.80

5.50

High Confidence
Eyewitness_____
Male
Female
6.50
5.30
4.10
3.90
6.30
5.70

Table 17:
3 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance of belief in
eyewitness confidence as an indicator of accuracy
Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

Condition
174.05
Conf idence
33. 08
Condition X Confidence
51.45
37. 41
Sex of Subject
67.92
Condition X Sex of S
6. 08
Confidence X Sex of S
36.65
Condition X Confidence
X Sex of Subject
3050.70
Error
Total

df

F
Mean
Square

2
1
2
1
2
1
2

87.03
33 .08
25.73
37.41
33.96
6, 08
18.33

108

28 .25

Signifie.
of F

3. 08
1.17
0.91
1. 32
1. 20
0.22
0.65

2457.33
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Estimated General Percentage of Accurate Eyewitness
Testimony
Subjects were asked to estimate on a Likert-type
scale the general percentage of eyewitness testimony
that is accurate.

Subjects in the Control conditions

estimated that 61% of eyewitness testimony is accurate,
compared to 4 7.5% in the Expert Only conditions and
57.25% in the Expert Plus Opposing Expert conditions
(see Table 18 for the means of the individual groups).
Subjects in the Low Confidence conditions estimated
that 55.8 3% of eyewitness testimony is accurate, versus
54.6 7% in the High Confidence conditions.

Male subjects

estimated that 61.67% of eyewitness testimony is accurate,
compared to 48.83% for Female subjects.

A 3 X 2 X 2

analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect
for condition.

Subsequent Newman-Keuls pairwise com

parisons indicate

that the Control groups

(X = 61.0,

n = 40) differ significantly from the Expert Only groups
(X = 4 7.5, n = 40) but not from the Expert Plus Opposing
Expert groups

(X = 57.25, n = 4 0); and that the Expert

Only groups differ significantly from the Expert Plus
Opposing Expert groups.

In addition, a significant main

effect for sex of subject was revealed, with Males giving
significantly higher percentages

(X = 61.7%)

witness testimony is accurate than Females

that eye

(X = 48.83).

See Table 19 for the ANOVA.
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Table 18: Means for each group on subjects' Likerttype estimations of the general percentage of accurate
eyewitness testimony
High Confidence
Eyewitness
Male
FCTiale

No Expert Testimony

Low Confidence
Eyewitness
Male!
Female
72%
56%

Expert Testimony Only

55%

41%

Expert Testimony Plus
58%
Opposing Expert Testimony

53%

56%
66%

63%

53%
38%
52%

Table 19:
3 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance of estimated
general percentage of accurate eyewitness testimony
Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
F
Square

2
1
2
1
2
1
2

1942.50 4. 80
40.83
.10
224.83
.56
4940. 83 12. 20
105.83
.26
40.83
.10
145.83
.36

3885.00
Condition
40,83
Confidence
451.67
Condition X Confidence
4940.83
Sex of Subject
211.67
Condition X Sex of S
40.83
Confidence X Sex of S
291.67
Condition X Confidence
X Sex of Subject
43730.00
Error

108

53592.50

119

Total

Signifie;
of F

404.91
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Eyewitness' Description of Crime as Basis for Gunman/
Innocent Person Decision
Subjects were asked to indicate on a ten-point
Likert scale how much they based their gunman versus
innocent person decision on the eyewitness'
of the crime

description

(1 = did not base decision on eyewitness'

description of the crime at all, 10 = based decision
largely upon eyewitness'

description of the crime).

Mean scores for individual groups are displayed in
Table 20.

Control group subjects gave mean ratings

of 6.98; mean for the Expert Only subjects was 6.40;
and mean for the Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony
groups was 6.7 25.

The mean of the Low Confidence

groups was 6.73, and for the High Confidence groups
it was 6.67.

For Males, the mean was 7.03, versus

6.37 for Females.

A 3 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance

revealed a significant interaction of Condition by
Confidence by Sex of Subject, and a near significant
(£ = .056} effect for Sex of Subject.

However, sub

sequent Newman-Keuls pairwise comparisons revealed no
significant differences among any pair of groups.
interaction is portrayed in Figure 5.

The ANOVA is

displayed in Table 21.
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Table 20 :
Means for each group on subjects' ten-point
Likert scale ratings of how much they based their gunman
versus innocent person decision on the eyewitness' descrip
tion of the crime (10 = based decision largely upon
eyewitness* description of the crime)

No Expert Testimony

Low Confidence
Eyewitness____
Male
Female
(Control)
7.0
7.6

Expert Testimony Only
Expert Testimony Plus

8-0
6.7

5.3
5.8

High Confidence
Eyewitness_____
Male
Female
6 .6

5.9
8 .0

6.7
6.4
6.4

Opposing Expert Testimony

Figure 5: Graph of interaction of condition by confidence
by sex of subject at eyewitness' description of crime as
basis for gunman/innocent person decision
Female

Male
8.0
7.5

8.0

7.5
7.0
6.5

7 0
6 5

6.0

6 0

5.5
5,0

5 5
5 0
High
Conf idence
Conditions

Low
Confidence
Conditions

O

High
Confidence
Conditions

Low
Conf idence
Conditions

Control Conditions
Expert Only Conditions
Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony Conditions
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Table 21
3 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance of description
of crime as a basis of gunman/innocent person decision
(10 = based decision largely upon eyewitness' description
of the crime, 1 = did not base decision on eyewitness'
description of the crime at all)
Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

df

Condition
6.65
Confidence
.13
Condition X Confidence 15.62
Sex of Subject
13.33
Condition X Sex of S
15.62
Confidence X Sex of S
3.33
Condition X Confidence 24.12
X Sex of Subject
396.40
Error

108

Total

119

475.20

2
1
2
1
2
1
2

Mean
F
Square
3.33
.13
7.81
13. 33
7.81
3. 33
12. 06

Signifie
of F

.91
.04
2.13
3.63
2.13
.91
3. 29
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Eyewitness Confidence As Bases of Gunman/Innocent
Person Decision
Subjects were asked to indicate on a ten-point
Likert scale how much their gunman versus innocent
person decision was based on the eyewitness confidence
in his testimony

(1 = did not base decision on the

eyewitness' confidence at all, 10 = based decision
largely upon the eyewitness'
in the Control conditions
Opposing Expert conditions

confidence).

(X = 6.03)
(X = 5.98)

Subjects

and Expert Plus
gave higher

mean ratings than did subjects in the Expert Only
conditions

(X = 4.60).

Subjects exposed to Low

Confidence videotapes based their decision on the
confidence of the eyewitness more

(X = 5.93)

subjects in the High Confidence conditions

than

(X = 5.13),

although this difference was not significant.
(X = 5.98)

Males

gave higher mean ratings on this measure

than did Females

(X = 5.08).

See Table 22 for the

means of the individual groups.

A 3 X 2 X 2 analysis

of variance revealed a significant main effect for
Condition;

subjects in both Control and Expert Plus

Opposing Expert conditions gave higher mean ratings
of how much they based their gunman versus innocent
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person decision on eyewitness confidence than subjects
in the Expert Only conditions.

The Confidence

and Sex of Subject

(_£ = .051)

icance.

23 for the ANOVA.

See Table

= .08)

effects approached signif
Subsequent Newman-

Keuls pairwise comparison indicated that this effect
was due to the subjects in the Control and Expert
Plus Opposing Expert conditions basing their decision
on eyewitness confidence significantly more than subjects
in the Expert Only groups; Control and Expert Plus
Opposing Expert Testimony groups did not differ signif
icantly from each other.
Table 22: Means for each group on subjects' ten—point
Likert scale ratings of how much they based their gunman
vs. innocent person decision upon the eyewitness'
confidence in his testimony <10 = based decision largely
upon the eyewitness' confidence)

No Expert Testimony
Expert Testimony Only
Expert Plus Opposing
Expert Testimony

Low Confidence
Eyewitness____
Female
Male
5.9
6,6
6-7
4.4
5.5
6.5

High Confidence
Eyewitness_____
Female
Male
6 .1
3.7
6.3
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3 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance of eyewitness
Table 23:
confidence as basis of gunman vs. innocent person decision
Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

Condition
52.317
Confidence
19.200
Condition X Confidence 18.950
Sex of Subject
24.300
Condition X Sex of S
1 .550
Confidence X Sex of S
5.633
Condition X Confidence
6.717
X Sex of Subject
Error
691.200
Total

819.867

df

Mean
F
Square

2
1
2
1
2
1
2

26.158
19.200
9.475
24.300
O i 775
5.633
3. 358

108

Signif i'
of F

4.09
3. 00
1.48
3.80
0.12
0.88
0. 53

6.400

119
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Eyewitness Testimony - Realism Ratings
Subjects were asked to rate their agreement on a
ten-point Likert scale with the following statement:
"The film presented a realistic example of an eye
witness testimony"
agree).

(1 = strongly disagree, 1 0 =

strongly

Mean realism ratings were sufficiently high

scross groups, with an overall mean of 6.43

(n = 120);

Ihe means of the individual groups are displayed in
Table 2 4.

A 3 X 2 X 2

analysis of variance of subjects'

realism ratings revealed no significant differences
among the cells, although the Condition effect approached
significance

= .056).

See Table

25 for the ANOVA.

Table 2 4: Means for each group on subjects' ten—point
Likert scale ratings of their agreement with the state
ment that the videotape presented a realistic example
of eyewitness testimony (1 = strongly disagree, 10 =
strongly agree)

No Expert Testimony
Expert Testimony Only

Low Confidence
Eyewitness____
Male
Female
6.8
7 .2
7.0
7.6

6.3
Expert Testimony Plus
Opposing Expert Testimony

5.9

High Confidence
Eyewitness_____
Male
Female
5.2
6.7
6.8
6.9
4.6
6 .2
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Table 25:
3 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance of eyewitness
testimony realism ratings for individual groups
Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

Condition
35.22
Conf idence
16.13
Condition X Confidence
1.82
Sex of Subject
17.63
Condition X Sex of S
2.62
Confidence X Sex of S
2.70
Condition X Confidence
4.55
X Sex of Subject
646.80
Error
Total

df

Mean
F
Square

2
1
2
1
2
1
2

17.61
16.13
.91
17.63
1.31
2.70
2. 28

108

Signifi
of F

2.94
2.69
.15
2. 94
.22
.45
.38

5.99

727,47
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Expert Testimony As a Basis of Subjects' Gunman/
Innocent Person Decision
Subjects in the Expert Testimony groups were asked
to indicate how much they based their gunman versus
innocent person decision upon the expert testimony on
a ten-point Likert scale

{1 = did not base decision

on the psychologist's expert testimony at all, 10 =
based decision largely upon the psychologist's expert
testimony).

Subjects in the Expert Testimony Only

conditions gave mean basis of decision ratings of
6.23, compared to mean ratings of 5.18 in the Expert
Plus Opposing Expert Testimony conditions.

See Table

2 6 for the means of the individual groups.

A 2 X 2 X 2

analysis of variance revealed no significant differences
among any of the cells, although the Condition effect
approached significance
effect

(£ = .06).

(_£ = .06) as did the Confidence

See Table 24 for the ANOVA.

Table 2 6: Means for each group on subjects’ ten-point
Likert scale ratings of how much they based their gun
man vs. innocent person decision upon expert testimony
(10 = based decision largely upon the psychologist’s
expert testimony)

5.8

High Confidence
Eyewi tness_____
Male
Female
6.7
6.8

5.5

3.9

Low Confidence
Eyewitness____
Male
Female
Expert Testimony Only
Expert Plus Opposing
Expert Testimony

5.6
5.3
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Table 27:
2 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance of expert
testimony as a basis of gunman versus innocent person
decision
Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

Condition
22. 05
Conf idence
1.80
Condition X Confidence 11.25
Sex of Subject
8.45
Condition X Sex of S
5. 00
Confidence X Sex of S
4.05
Condition X Confidence
5. 00
X Sex of Subject
455.20
Error
Total

512.80

df

Mean
F
Square

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

22.05
1.80
11. 25
8.45
5.00
4. 05
5.00

72

Signifie
of F

3.49
.29
1.78
1 .34
.79
.64
.79

6.32

79
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Realism Ratings of Expert Testimony by First Psychologist
Subjects in the Expert Testimony Only and Expert
Plus Opposing Expert Testimony conditions were asked
to indicate on a ten-point Likert scale their agreement
with the following statement:

"The film presented a

realistic and believable example of a psychologist
(Dr. Walters)

giving testimony on research in the area

of eyewitness testimony"

(10 = strongly agree, 1 =

strongly disagree).

Mean realism ratings of all groups

were adequately high

(Overall mean = 6.58, n = 80) and

are presented in Table 2 8,

A 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of

variance of subjects' ratings of realism revealed no
significant differences among any of the cells, al
though the Condition effect
significance.

= .0500)

approached

See Table 2 9 for the ANOVA.

Table 2 8: Means for each group on subjects* ten-point
Likert scale ratings of their agreement with the state
ment that the film presented a realistic example of a
psychologist giving expert testimony <10 = strongly
agree, 1 = strongly disagree)
Low Confidence
Eyewitness____
Female
Male

High Confidence
Eyewitness_____
Female
Male

No Expert Testimony
Expert Testimony Only

7.3

Expert Plus Opposing
Expert Testimony

6.0

7.1
5.4

6.5
7.0
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Table 2 9: 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance of expert
testimony realism ratings for individual groups
Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
F
Square

Condition
22.05
Conf idence
1.25
Condition X Confidence
4.05
Sex of Subject
1.25
Condition X Sex of S
8.45
Confidence X Sex of S
.45
Condition X Confidence
4.05
X Sex of Subject
Error
410.00

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

22. 05
1. 25
4.05
1.25
8.45
.45
4.05

Total

79

451.55

Signif i<
of F

3.87
.22
.71
.22
1.48
.08
.71

72
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Realism Ratings of Expert Testimony by Second Psychologist
Subjects in the Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony
condition were asked to indicate on a ten-point Likert
scale their agreement with the following statement:
"The film presented a realistic and believable example
of a psychologist

(Dr. Watkins)

giving testimony on

research in the area of eyewitness testimony"
strongly disagree,

10 = strongly agree).

(1 =

Mean realism

ratings of all groups were acceptably high and are
displayed in Table 30.

A 2 X 2 analysis of variance

revealed no significant differences among any of the
cells.

See Table 31 for the ANOVA.

Table 30: Means for each group on subjects' ten— point
Likert scale ratings of their agreement with the state
ment that the film presented a realistic example of a
psychologist giving expert testimony (10 = strongly
agree, 1 = strongly disagree)
Low Confidence
Eyewitness____
Female
Male

High Confidence
Eyewitness_____
Female
Male

No Expert Testimony
Expert Testimony Only
Expert Plus Opposing
Expert Testimony

6.1

5.8

5.2

Overall mean = 5.48, n = 40

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4.8

page

89

Table 31:
2 X 2 analysis of variance of expert testimony
realism ratings for individual groups
Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
F
Square

Confidence
Sex of Subject
Confidence X Sex of S
Error

9. 025
1.225
.250
237.700

1
1
1
36

9.025
1.225
.250

Total

247.975

39

Signif ica:
of F

1.367
0.186
.004
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Effect of Opposing Psychologist on Gunman/Innocent
Person Decision
Subjects were asked to indicate on a ten-point
Likert scale the extent to which the opposing
psychologist's

(Dr. Watkins)

(second)

testimony affected their

decision concerning whether they thought the eyewitness
had identified the gunman or an innocent person

(1 =

did not based decision on the second psychologist's
expert testimony at all, 10 = based decision largely
upon the second psychologist's expert testimony).

In

the Low Confidence conditions, subjects gave a mean
rating of 4.60, compared to 4.0 5 in the High Con
fidence conditions.
(X = 4.90)

Males provided higher mean ratings

than did Females

(X = 3.75).

Means for the

individual groups are portrayed in Table 32.

A 2 X 2

analysis of variance revealed no significant differences
among the groups.

The ANOVA is displayed in Table 33.

Table 3 2: Means for each group on subjects' ten-point
Likert Scale
ratings of
the effect of the
opposing
psychologist on their gunman vs. innocent person decision
(10 = based decision largely on the second psychologist's
expert testimony)
Low Confidence
Eyewitness
Male
Female
Expert Testimony Plus
5.6
Opposing Expert Testimony

3.6

High Confidence
Eyewitness_____
Male
Female
4.2
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Table 3 3: 2 X 2 analysis of variance of effect of
opposing psychologist on subjects' gunman versus
innocent person decision
Source of variation

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
F
Square

Confidence
Sex of Subject
Confidence X Sex of S
Error

3.025
13.225
7. 225
201.300

1
1
1
36

3. 025
13.225
7.225
5.592

Total

224.775

39

Significance
of F
0.541
2.365
1.292
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Familiarity with Experts Giving Testimony on Eyewitness
Research
Subjects in the Expert Testimony Only and Expert
Plus Opposing Expert Testimony conditions were asked
if they had ever seen the expert(s) depicted in the
videotape(s)
capacity

before

(yes or no) and, if so, in what

(open-ended question).

conditions, only two

In the Expert Only

(2) out of forty

had seen Dr. Walters before.

In the Expert Plus

Opposing Expert Testimony conditions,
of forty

(40) subjects

zero

(0) out

(40) subjects had seen Dr. Walters previous

ly, and only two

(2) out of forty

familiar with Dr. Watkins.

(40) subjects were

Chi square tests suggest

support for the null hypothesis that both psycholo
gists would be equally well known to subjects in both
conditions

(x^ <

(D , 2

^ .05) .
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
As hypot±iesized, significant differences were
found among the groups in regard to whether subjects
believed that the eyewitness giving testimony had
identified the gunman who committed the crime or an
innocent person.

Expert Testimony Only subjects

showed a significant reduction in their belief that
the eyewitness accurately chose the gunman compared
to Control Group subjects, who did not hear any
expert testimony.

Subjects who were exposed to

both Expert and Opposing Expert Testimony had re
duced belief in the eyewitness when compared to Control
subjects, but believed that the eyewitness had
accurately identified the gunman more often than
those exposed to only the Expert Testimony.

These

findings follow logically from those of Fox
but fail to replicate Weisser's
Fox

(Note 1),

(Note 2) results;

(Note 1) found similar expert testimony effects

while Weisser

(Note 2) did not.

As Kazdin

(1980)

has pointed out, the importance of replication in
scientific research cannot be overemphasized.
study is the second attempt to replicate Fox

This
(Note 1),

93
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a sort of ”tie-breaker" in this series of eyewitness
testimony studies.

Also, the results lend support to

the notion that Weisser's

(Note 2) results may have

been related to sampling variability rather than the
fact that jurors already possess the knowledge about
eyewitness testimony that is usually provided by the
expert psychologist.

Perhaps more importantly, such

results suggest that opposing expert testimony may be
used successfully by the prosecution to mitigate the
impact of the use of expert testimony by the defense
counsel.
A factor which has not yet been researched exten
sively in the eyewitness testimony/expert witness area,
sex of subject, was found to not be related to subjects'
belief in whether the eyewitness identified the gunman
or an innocent person.

This result provides some

elucidation to one of the questions which have not
yet been answered as to which subject-juror variables
effect decision making,
religion, etc.

such as age, sex, education,

Certainly, subject-juror variables

warrant further, detailed examination to enhance
jury selection and create a juror profile.

The

evidence provided herein in this regard is somewhat
circumscribed in that it is relevant only to the
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specific circumstances surrounding the instant case.
As expected. Expert Testimony alone significantly
reduced guilt ratings and the belief that the eye
witness had correctly identified the gunman.

In

addition, subjects in the Expert Testimony Only con
dition reported the highest mean decision confidence
ratings, although these results did not attain
statistical significance.

Together, these findings

suggest that the Expert Testimony by itself did
significantly affect subjects; that is, subjects
were more confident in their decision that the eye
witness identified an innocent person and they were
less likely to believe the eyewitness had identified
the gunman.

Thus, there is strong support for the

impact of psychological expert testimony on subjects'
belief in an eyewitness.
Subjects who viewed Expert Testimony Only tapes
had significantly lower estimates of the percentage
of people who would make a correct identification
under the circumstances described than subjects in
the Control conditions, who were not exposed to expert
testimony, but only in the Low Confidence groups.
This implies that subjects found the expert's informtion useful in their appraisal of a low confidence
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eyewitness; they found the eyewitness less credible
as a result of the expert testimony, and apparently
felt that eyewitnesses exposed to similar circumstances
would be inaccurate.
tions,

In the High Confidence condi

subjects who viewed both Expert and Opposing

Expert Testimony tapes had significantly higher ratings
of the percentage of people who would make a correct
identification under the circumstances described than
those w h o viewed only the Expert Testimony videotape.
Apparently a high confidence eyewitness retains
credibility despite expert testimony both supporting
and discounting the reliability of eyewitness testimony.
Similarly,

subjects in the Expert Only conditions

gave significantly lower estimated general percentages
of accurate eyewitness testimony than subjects in
the Control and Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony
conditions.

This supports the efficacy of utilizing

expert testimony to reduce jurors* belief in the guilt
of a defendant when those beliefs are dependent on
eyewitness testimony.

In estimating percentages of

accurate eyewitness testimony, males gave significantly
higher percentage estimates than did females; implying
that males found the eyewitness'

testimony more

credible and were affected less by the expert's testi
mony.

Groups, however, did not differ significantly
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on ratings of how much they based their gunman versus
innocent person decision on the eyewitness* descrip
tion of the crime.
The manipulation check showed that subjects
perceived the high confidence eyewitness as signif
icantly more confident than the low confidence
eyewitness, as expected.

However, the near— significant

interaction of Confidence with Condition suggests that
subjects in the Control Conditions were affected more
by the confidence of the eyewitness than subjects in
the other two conditions.

In addition, the interaction

of Confidence and Sex of Subject also closely approached
significance,

suggesting that males were affected more

by the confidence of the eyewitness than were females.
Realism ratings showed that both types of expert testi
mony and both eyewitness videotape segments were viewed
by subjects as believable, increasing the generalizability
of the results.

Both the manipulation check results and

realism ratings are consistent with findings obtained
in the Fox

(Note 1) and Weisser

(Note 2) studies, which

utilized several.of the same videotapes.
In regard to the effects of the confidence variable,
the hypothesis that expert testimony would have more
influence on the subjects' belief in whether the eye
witness had identified the gunman or an innocent person
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in the high eyewitness confidence condition than in
the low confidence condition was not supported.
result replicates the Fox

(Note 1) findings.

This

Subjects

in the Expert Testimony Only groups had the lowest
ratings of belief in eyewitness confidence as an
indicator of accuracy, although this difference was
not significant.

In addition. Expert Testimony alone

was effective in significantly reducing subjects'
reported reliance on eyewitness confidence as a basis
of their gunman versus innocent person decision.
Thus, subjects were markedly influenced by the com
pelling arguments presented by the first expert against
overreliance on expert testimony.

These effects, how

ever, were mitigated when subjects were exposed to the
strong arguments of the opposing expert in favor of
eyewitness testimony; that is, mean ratings in the
Expert Plus Opposing Expert conditions returned to
similar levels to those given by Control subjects not
exposed to expert testimony at all in regard to con
fidence variables.
Subjects in the Expert Testimony Only conditions
based their gunman versus innocent person decision on
the Expert Testimony more than subjects in the Expert
Plus Opposing Expert Testimony conditions

(nearly
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significant).

In the latter conditions, subjects gave only

moderate mean ratings of the extent to which the opposing
psychologist's testimony affected their gunman versus in
nocent person decision.

One might hypothesize that in the

Expert Only conditions, subjects received clear and dir
ectional messages about the unreliability of eyewitness
testimony, making their gunman versus innocent person deci
sion much simpler.

However, in the Expert Plus Opposing

Expert conditions, subjects received opposing messages from
equally credible experts, creating a situation of dissonance
for the subject— jurors.

Also, order effects may have been

partially responsible for the differences.

Perhaps the

latter subjects had to rely on other factors more to make
their final decision; and such subjects may have fallen back
on eyewitness confidence as a deciding factor.

In fact,

responses to the open-ended question regarding how the sub
jects made their gunman versus innocent person decision
provide some support for these hypotheses.

For example,

several subjects who believed the eyewitness had identified
the gunman had relied upon their own impression that it
would be very difficult to forget the criminal's face under
the circumstances described, and that they would remember
the criminal's face for over a month
Wells and Lindsay

(consistent with the

(1983) metamemory theory, specifically

conditional information or acting on "self-based judgments);
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some mentioned that the eyewitness had remembered the
rest of the crime so clearly that he would also remember
the criminal's face; and others noted that the lighting
would be good in a convenience store such as the one
described in the videotape.

On the other hand, subjects

in the Expert Plus Opposing Expert conditions who
believed that the eyewitness had identified an innocent
person relied on the lack of corroborating evidence,
the fact that the eyewitness had never actually witnessed
the shooting, and that a reasonable doubt remained as to
the defendant's guilt.

Confidence was cited as a factor

both by subjects who believed the eyewitness had identi
fied an innocent person,

and by those who believed he

had identified the gunman.
Limitations of the present study include the brevity
of both eyewitness and expert testimony, the lack of
portrayal of cross-examination, the fact that subjects
were aware that the events were simulated, and that only
one type of crime with only one eyewitness and certain
experts were included in the investigation.

Future

research is needed to explore such variables as the
order of presentation of the experts, the demographic
factors associated with both the eyewitness and the
experts

(e.g., a g e , sex, appearance, etc.), effects of

type of crime portrayed

(e.g., violent, non—violent, sexual),

and how each of these factors and others interact with
each other and with specific juror characteristics.
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APPENDIX 1
LOW CONFIDENCE EYEWITNESS TRANSCRIPT
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Introduction - (read to subjects by blind experimental
assistant) - "At the beginning of this portion of the
videotape of the trial, the prosecuting attorney asked
the eyewitness to state his name and occupation."
Prosecution
Witness:
My name is, ah, Roy Wilkins.
manager of the 7-11 store.

Ah - I'm the

Prosecutor:
Describe in your own words what happened
the night of November 14, 1981.
W: Well, I was - I was in the back of the store, ah,
um, working.
Larry, that's Larry Gelbart, was out front
at - at the register.
Ah, business was slow that night
and I'd gone back to get some stock for the shelves, ah,
just to keep busy, you see.
P:
And what time was this?
W:
U m mm . .. let's see, oh, it must have been pretty close
to 11:30, I'd say.
P: And what happened then?
W:
Well, I — first I thought I heard somebody talking talking kind of loud out front, it ah - it sounded to me
as
if maybe Larry was in an argument with somebody, and
soI - I decided to go out and — and
see what was — what
was going on.
About the time I thought I should go on
out, ah, it seems that - well there was a loud noise.
Ah,
at first I thought maybe it was a gunshot, ah - ah, I
wasn't - I wasn't sure.
But anyway, I - I quick ran to
the- to the front of the sotre, ah, and
ah, and I saw, I
saw two men at the - at the counter, and it seemed to me
that - that they were - that they were emptying - emptying
the t ill. And ah, there was - there was another man, I
was pretty sure he was holding a gun.
Um, I looked around
and - and there was Larry, Larry was lying on the floor.
Ah, ah, I don't recall, I think maybe he - he wasn't moving
Ah, ah- anyway the whole scene, ah - startled me.
I um,
I— I guess, and — and when this man that I - I thought
was holding the gun saw me, he ah- he called to the other
two fellows to get out of the store.
And ah- and then he
took a shot at me.
And it must have — it must have gone
into the wall behind me.
P: And how long did all this take?
W:
Oh, I - I don't know, I - I suppose a - maybe about a
minute.
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How did they get away?
W: Well...let's see.
If I'm not mistaken ah- ah, the
two - the two with the money ran off first.
Yes, they they,, they ran off first.
Ah, this man that was, ah,
holding the gun, ah, he must - he i \ist have left last.
I noticed - I believe he stumbled as he went through
the door.
I saw him - I saw him get up, and then he
ran on down the street, ah, with the other two. And,
ah, a little while later, it was, oh I suppose a matter
of a few seconds I — I saw — ah, I heard a car squeal out.
P: Did you see this car?
W: No, ah - no, I - I guess - I guess it must have been
around the corner.
Ah, yes it was around the corner, out
of sight.
P: And what did you do then?
W: Well... when I um, ah, when I saw them run down the
street um, I - I hurried back to check on Larry, to see
if he was um, if he was all right.
And ah, um- well,
I- I realized he was dead.
I- I must have^ I must have
called the police next.
And then when they came down I,
I called the ambulance, the ambulance came and - and, ah,
took Larry away.
And ah - I guess I gave them a descrip
tion at that time of what had happened - what I saw.
P i How old would you say they were?
W: Well, they were probably, ah, probably pretty young,
ah...I'd say, oh, nineteen, maybe 24 years old, maybe.
P: And what were they wearing?
W: Well, if I recall right, u m . .. the one, um, the one
with the gun, um, I think he was wearing a long, brown,
sort of a heavy coat.
One of the others had on a jacket,
um, it must have been a blue ski jacket.
And, um, the
other was was wearing agreen coat.
Yes, that...he was
wearing a green coat, I — I think they all had — had
jeans... jeans on.
P;
Did you
get a good look at their faces?
W: Well, I
- I guess so. At least, um, I got a good
look at the face, um, of the man with the gun.
Um, the
other two, they seemed to have their backs to me much —
much of the time.
P: What were the lighting conditions like, was there
enough light to see them?
W:
Well, um, probably, I — I, I think so...we had the...
we had the regular store lights on.
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first degree murder
Well, I - I believe
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identified a suspect as being
who committed armed robbery
that night?
so.

Describe this identification for the court.
W
Well, um, you see when the police called me, ah,
they said I should come down.
That they, ah, they had
a suspect, that, ah, fitted the description, ah, that
I had, that I had given them.
And so I went down, u m . ..
they had him in a cell, um, he was all by himself.
And
ah- ah, I looked at the man, ah, for a while and, and
I was pretty sure he was the man.
And so I - I told
the police that ah- he must be the right man.
P: And was that man the defendant?
W:
Yes, sir.
Introduction (read to subjects by experimental assistant
blind to the experimental hhpotheses) - "At the beginning
of this portion of videotape of the trial, the defending
attorney noted that the eyewitness stated earlier that
all of what he saw happened in about a minute.
He then
asked the eyewitness how much of this time the eywitness
estimated that he spent looking at the gunman's face."
Defense
Defense Attorney:
You stated earlier that all of what
you saw happened in "about a minute".
How much of this
time would you estimate that you spent looking at the
gunman's face?
Witness:
Well, I- I would say, um. I- I would say about
thirty seconds.
U m . .. yes- yes it was about 30 secondsD: Are you saying you managed to look at his face for a
half minute while he fired a shot at you?
W: Well,
um. . . I guess I was so amazed at what way hap
pening, um. .. just like I said I - u m . .. I just stopped
dead in my tracks.
And ah... I guess he missed me be
cause, he must have been moving, I think he was moving,
trying to get out of the store all the time, see?
D: When he raised the gun to take a shot at you did you
try to move out of the way?
W:
Well, he raised it so quickly I- I guess I didn't
have time
to react, I — I didn't have time to get out of
the way, u m
I did jump, I must have jumped when he when he shot the gun.
It — it scared the life out of me.
Why, I've just never been in anything like that before.
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Was he moving all the while you saw him?

W z Yes • • •umtn « « «we 11^ I” I th m k he wa s ^ i — I *nt piretty
sure and- and I guess t h a t ’s when I got a- a pretty
good look at his face.
D: Where were you looking during the other thirty
seconds, when you weren't looking at the gunman's face?
W: Well, ah...at L a r r y . ..Um, he was in bad shape
there, lying on the floor.
D: Well, are you sure that you didn't spend more than
half the time looking at Larry?
W: Ah...let me think, ah... you see, when I- when I
first came out from the back of the store I, I guess
I was looking mainly at Larry.
But then when I realized
what was happening, I spent most of the rest of the
time looking at the robbers, you see. And, ah... when
this- when this one man raised the gun to shoot at me,
that really drew m y attention and, I must have looked
at him the rest of the time.
D: You say it was the gun that drew your attention?
W: Well, yes, I ah...I- I really couldn't believe what
was happening.
I just couldn't believe what was hap
pening.
And when he raised the gun, I was so stunned
I- well, I could hardly take my eyes off of it.
D:
How far away was he standing from you?
W:
Hmm...I'd say, ah...oh, just about thirty feet.
D:

Are you sure it wasn't 35 feet, let's say, or 4 0 feet?

W:
was
D:
how

W e l l , u m . ..Well, I ...I don't know, um...I think it
about thirty feet.
When you made the identification at the police station,
long was that after the crime?

W: About a month.
D : Do you feel that you had a good enough look at the
criminal's face during all the excitement to be able to
identify him a month later?
W:
Well, I- I- I think so.
D:
When you went down to the police station to make the
identification, did the police say anything to you before
showing you the suspect?
W: Well, let's see, um. . . the sergeant told me that, they
had a- a suspect that fitted the description that I gave
them.
And, um, he said that they were pretty sure that
this was the man they were looking for.
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Did he say anything else to you?

W;
Well... let m e ... he did say that, ah, this had been
a tough case for them, and that, um, they were going to
be mighty glad to have it closed and off the books.
D: Was there anything distinctive or unusual about
the defendant's face that helped you identify him?
W: No... I... I just remembered what he looked like.
D: Well, what would you say were the features you
relied upon to identify him?
W:
Oh, probably his brown hair, and his average build,
and - and height, and ah, well, just the- just the look
on his face, I guess.
D: Well, how sure are you that the defendant is the
criminal rather than merely resembling the criminal?
W: Well, I...I'm pretty certain.
D: Mr. Wilkins, did you hear the defendant testify
earlier that he shopped in your store two orthree
times during the two or three months previous to the
crime?
W:
Yes, yes I did, that.
D: Well, is it possible that you identified the
defendant because you remembered seeing him in your
store before and he just happens to resemble the
actual criminal?
W: No, I ... I probably wouldn't do that, I...Um...I
don't think so, no. I... I probably wouldn't do that.
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Introduction - (read to subjects by experimental
assistant blind to the experimental hypotheses) "At the beginning of this portion of the videotape
of the trial, the prosecuting attorney asked the eye
witness to state his name and occupation,"
Prosecution
Witness:
My name is Roy Wilkins, W-I-L-K-I-N-S.
the manager of the 7-11 store.

I'm

Prosecutor:
Describe in your own words what happened
the night of November 14, 1981,
W: Well, I was in the back of the store working.
Larry, Larry Gelbart, was out front at the register.
Business was slow that night and I'd gone back to get
some stock for the shelves, just to keep busy.
P
What time was this?
W
It was ah, it was 11:30 at night.
P

And what happened then?

w

Well, I heard someone talking loud out front.
Sounded as if Larry was having an argument with somebody,
So I decided to go out and see what was going on. Well,
as soon as I decided to go out, I heard a shot, a gun
shot.
Well, I quick ran to the front of the store, I
saw two robbers at the counter emptying the till.
There
was a third one standing there holding a gun. Larry
was over here (gestures) lying on the floor, he wasn't
moving.
Well, I was so scared I - I stopped dead in my
tracks.
And when the one holding the gun saw me, he
yelled to the other two to get out of the store right
away.
And he raised the gun, took a shot at me, it
went into the wall.
P:
And how long did all this take?
W:

Just about a minute.

P : How did they get away?
W:
Well, the two with the money, ran out first
- the
one with the gun left last, he stumbled just
as he went
out the door.
He got up and ran out into the street
with the other two.
And a couple of seconds later I
heard a car squeal out.
Did

P:
W:

No,

P:

And
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W: Well, when I saw thorn run down the street I hurried
back to check on Larry, to see that he - to see if he
was still alive.
He was dead.
And so I - i called the
police, they came down, the ambulance took Larry away.
I gave them a complete description of what I saw.
P: Now how old would you say they are?
W:
P:

Well, they were young, 19, 24 years of age.
And what were they wearing?

W: Well, the one holding the gun was wearing a long
brown heavy coat.
And one of the others had on a blue
ski jacket.
The other, a green coat. All of them were
wearing jeans.
P:

Did you get a good look at their faces?

W:
I got a good look at the face of the one with the
gun.
The other two had their backs to me most of the time
P : What were the lighting conditions like - was there
enough light to see?
W:

Oh, yes, w e had the regular store lights on.

P:
Have you positively identified a suspect as being
the person with the gun who committed armed robbery
and first degree murder that night?
W:
Yes, yes.
P : Describe this identification for the court.
W: Well, the police called me, asked me to come down,
they said they had a suspect.
So I went down, and they
had him in a cell, all by himself.
And as soon as I
saw him, I knew he was the m a n . I told the police they
had the right man.
P:
Was that the defendant?
W:
P:

Yes.
Thank you, Mr. Wilkins, I have no other questions.

Defense
Introduction — (read to subjects by experimental assistant
blind to the experimental hypotheses) - "At the beginning
of this portion of videotape of the trial, the defending
attorney noted that the eyewitness tated earlier that
all of what he saw happened in about a minute.
He then
asked the eyewitness how much of this time the eyewitness
estimated that he spent looking at the gunman* s face.
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Defense Attorney:
How much of this time would you
estimate that you spent looking at the gunman's face?
Witness:
About thirty seconds.
D: Are you saying the, that you managed to look at his
face for a half minute while he fired
a shot at you?
W:
I was so amazed at what was going
on, just like I
said, I stopped dead in my tracks. And he missed me
because he was moving
trying to get out of the store
as soon as he could,
D: When he raised the
you try to move out of

gun to take a shot at you, did
the way?

W:
He raised it so quickly I didn't have time to react,
to get out of the way.
I did jump when he shot the gun
— I've never been in
anything likethat before.
D: Was he moving all the while you saw him?
W : Yes - he paused when he took the shot at me, and
that's when I got a good look at his face.
D: Where were you looking during the other thirty
seconds when you weren't looking at the gunman's face?
W:

At Larry.

He was in bad shape lying there on the floor.

D: Are you sure you didn't spend more than half the time
looking at Larry?
W: Oh, no. When I first came out from the back of the
store, I looked mainly at Larry.
But when I realised
what had happened, I was looking mainly at the robbers.
Like when the one raised the gun to take a shot at me,
that really drew my attention.
I spent at least half
time — half of the rest of the time looking at him.
D: You say the gun drew your attention?
W: Well, of course, I couldn't believe what was happening.
And when he raised the gun, I was so stunned I could
hardly take my eyes off it.
D : How far away were you standing from him?
W:
D:

Just about thirty feet.
Are you sure it wasn't 35 feet, let's say, or 4 0 feet?

W:
No, it was thirty feet.
D: When you made the identification at the police station,
how long was that after the crime?
W:

About a month.
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Do you feel that you had a good enough look at
criminal’s face during all that excitement to be
to identify him a month later?
Oh, yes.
Yes.

D:
Let me ask you this.
When you went down to the
police station to make the identification, did the
police say anything to you before showing you the
suspect?
W: Oh, the sergeant said that they had a suspect that
fitted the description that I had given them.
He said
he was pretty sure that, ah, he was the right man.
D : Did he say anything else to you?
W:
He mentioned what a tough case this had been for
them and how glad they were going to be to have it
closed and off the books,
D: Was there anything distinctive or unusual about the
defendant's face that helped you identify him?
W:
No, I just remembered what he looked like.
D: What would you say were the features you relied upon
to identify him?
W:
Oh, his brown hair, his average build and height,
and that look on his face.
D:
Well, how sure are you that the defendant is the
criminal rather than merely resembling the criminal?
W:
Oh, I'm certain.
D: Mr. Wilkins, did you hear the defendant testify that
he shopped in your store two or three times during the
two or three months prior to the crime?
W:
Oh, yes.
Yes.
D: Well, is it possible that you
identified the defendant
because you remembered seeing him in your-store before and
he just happens to resemble the actual criminal?
W: No- no, no. I'm sure he's the man.
I could never
forget that look on his face.
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Introduction - (read to subjects by experimental
assistant blind to the experimental hypotheses) "At the beginning of this portion of the videotape
of the trial, ^ e defending attorney asked Dr. Walters
how accurate, in general, the average eyewitness is."
Relevant Factors Expert Testimony
Defense Attorney:
...how accurate would you say the
average eyeiwtness is?
Dr. Walters:
Research using staged crimes has shown
that, depending on the conditions, anywhere from 15%
to 85% of eyewitnesses may choose a wrong person from
a lineup or group of pictures.
That is, depending upon
the conditions, 15% to 85% of eyewitnesses choose a
person from the lineup that they believe is the criminal
but who, in reality, is not the criminal but rather is
an innocent suspect,
D: Could you elaborate for us how these researchers
stage crimes for the eyewitnesses to observe?
W: Many have the subjects view films of crimes, other
studies use crimes staged by the experimenter. After
the subjects see the crime, they are asked at a later
time to identify the criminal from a lineup of people
or from a group of pictures.
D:
So then the eyewitnesses in this research do some
times see an actual event?
W:
Yes.
In some of the experiments that have been done,
the subjects do see actual live events.
Often a theft
or assault is ateged for the subjects, so it* s relatively
ccHTimon to use a live event, but not as common as films
because the psychologists want to have some control of
the materials so you know every time you are presenting
it to a new group of people you are presenting exactly
the same thing, whereas a live event might change a
little bit each time its presented.
D: Could you give us an example of one of these staged
crimes?
W: A situation that's used fairly often is to have some
one attack or assault a professor while he's lecturing
in front of a college classroom.
The criminal is actually
staging the attack and the professor knows the attack is
going to happen, but to the audience it looks like a real
assault is taking place.
The people in the class are
then asked to pick the attacker out of a lineup of people
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or out of a set of pictures.
In this type of experiment,
the people in the audience, the eyewitnesses to this
crime, are often unreliable and inaccurate in their
identifications.
D: What are some of the factors that affect eyewitness'
memory and ability to make an accurate identification?
W:
There are several physical factors that affect eye
witness reliability.
The lighting conditions, the distance
of the eyewitness from the criminal, are factors.
There
should be adequate light - the eyewitness should be
close enough to make an identification.
Also, whether
the criminal was moving or not may be important - fast
movement may lower the likelihood of an accurate identi
fication .
D: What about time and its effects on memory?
W:
Generally, the shorter the time span the eyewitness
has seen the criminal, the more likely it is that the
identification may be in error.
The length of time from
seeing the crime to identifying the criminal is also
important - research has generally shown that parts of
memory are lost over time.
D: What are some of the other factors that affect an
eyewitness* ability to make an accurate identification?
W:
One of the major factors is stress.
Research indi
cates that people under stress are more likely to make
certain types of errors.
D:
What are some of these errors?
W:
Stress often causes people to overestimate the amount
of time the event or crime took.
That is, what may only
have taken 10 to 15 seconds may seem like it took much
longer, say a minute, or even five minutes.
So the
amount of time that an eyewitness views the criminal's
face may be an overestimation if the person is under a
lot of stress.
There are factors related to stress such
as violence and the presence of a weapon that also reduce
eyewitness* ability to make a correct identification.
D: How does the presence of violence influence eyewit
nesses?
W:
Research supports the idea that people viewing a
violent, emotional event or crime are less likely to be
able to accurately report what they saw than people who
see a nonviolent event.
Researchers explain this effect
as being due to the emotionality or stress associated with
the violent event.
You see, there is research which sup
ports stress having a number of general effects upon the
way a person sees an event or crime.
I mentioned before
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the tendency for people under stress to overestimate the
amount of time the crime took.
Stress can also have a
restricting effect on attention - people just don't pay
as much attention to what's going on - particularly if
there is a weapon, such as a gun or knife, present at
the scene of the crime.
D:
How does the presence of a gun affect the way
person perceives or sees a crime.

a

W:
Dr. Loftus, one of the leading researchers and
authorities in the field of eyewitness testimony, talks
about a factor called "weapon focus." What happens when
a weapon is present is it tends to capture some of the
witness' processing time and capacity, leaving less time
available for other details and for other aspects of the
incident.
Weapon focus may have the effect of reducing
ability to describe and remember other aspects of the
situation^ such as remembering the person who was holding
the weapon.
However, people often have avery good
ability to describe the weapon.
That's what is meant
by weapon focus.
D: What about the number of criminals committing a
crime, would that affect the ability of an eyewitness
to accurately perceive a crime?
W:
Yes.
Research has found that the more criminals
present, the less accurate eyewitnesses report of the
crime is.
Again, during abrief period of time, having
more than one criminal present requires more processing
time.
There's only so many details a person can process
in a short period of time.
D: Are there any kinds or types of faces that are
more likely to be remembered by an eyewitness?
W:
Yes, people usually remember really unusual or
distinctive faces easier; research has shown, that they
do this better than remembering faces with no distinctive
features.
For instance, someone with an unusual nose,
or someone with a noticeable scar on his face is more
likely to be remembered by the eyewitness than someone
who has no unusual features or an "average" looking face
that's similar to a lot of other persons,
Dî
Is it possible that an eyewitness might misidentify
someone as the criminal because his face looks familiar
because of a contact sometime before the crime?
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W: Yes, the term for this is "unconscious transference".
This happens when an eyewitness confuses a person seen
in one situation with a person that was seen in a
different situation or in a different context.
People
will look at faces that they have seen at a different
time - in different contexts - and mistakenly relate
those faces back to an incorrect situation.
Introduction — (read to subjects by experimental assistant
blind to the experimental hypotheses) - "At the beginning
of this portion of videotape of the trial, the prosecuting
attorney asked Dr, Walters to give an example of uncon
scious transference."
Prosecution
Prosecutor:
Could you give an example of unconscious
transference?
Dr. Walters:
Patrick Wall has given a classic example
of a train clerk who was robbed at gunpoint.
The train
clerk subsequently went to a lineup and picked a sailor
out of the lineup.
The sailor did not commit the robbery,
had a very good alibi, but had purchased tickets from
this train clerk on three prior occasions.
What is
happening in this situation is the train clerk, the
witness, goes to the lineup.
In fact, there is face
in the lineup that looks familiar and that familiarity
is mistakenly related back to the crime, rather than
back to the purchasing of the tickets.
That's a classic
example of unconscious transference.
P: Are there factors which can affect an eyewitness'
identification of a suspect, let's say, when he's asked
to do so by the police?
W:
It's very important that the eyewitness have the
opportunity to pick the suspect out of a "fair" lineup.
The chances of misidentification are reduced if the
eyewitness chooses a person out of a group of persons
who bear a reasonable resemblance to each other, who
look at least somewhat alike.
For instance, people in
the lineup are of the same race, same sex, no gross
height or weight differences.
If that is done, the
chance of misidentification is reduced.
It is generally
agreed that the worst method to use and the method with
the greatest likelihood of a. wrong person being identi
fied as the criminal is what's called a "showup".
In
a showup, the police simply show the eyewitness a suspect
by himself and ask the eyewitness if that's the person
who committed the crime.
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P: What are some of the factos that make showing only
one person to the eyewitness a poor procedure?
W:
The eyewitness often believes that the police have
a good reason for showing them the suspect, that they
have some incriminating evidence against the suspect,
something like this.
There are often subtle but power
ful psychological pressures on the eyewitness to identify
the suspect as the criminal.
This effect will be
especially increased if the police put pressure on the
eyewitness to identify the suspect, for example, they
might tell the eyewitness that they think they have the
right man, or by indicating that they'll be pleased if
the eyewitness can identify the suspect.
People are
often especially likely to be influenced by someone in
authority, such as the police.
Showing only one suspect
to the eyewitness is likely to increase psychological
factors influencing the witness to identify the suspect
as the criminal.
P: Would the eyewitness' confidence in the identifi
cation by any indication of how accurate the identification
is?
W:
There is considerable research evidence showing that
the confidence of an eyewitness may have little or no
relationship to the accuracy of the eyewitness.
The
confidence of the eyewitness in his identification is
not a good indicator of how accurate his identification
is likely to be.
P: What if the eyewitness is so confident that he
identified the right person as the criminal that he
says, "I'd never forget that face. I'm sure that's the
man" after making an identification.
Would a statement
like that increase the likelihood that the witness made
an accurate identification?
W: Again, the relationship of confidence to accuracy
has generally been found to be weak to nonexistent.
It
would not be uncommon for a highly confident witness to
be wrong, to be entirely in error, even if he made a
statement like that.
P:
Dr. Walters, could you summarize for the court how
a person might best judge the accuracy of an eyewitness
identification?
W:
As I mentioned earlier, depending on the conditions,
anywhere from 15% to 85% of eyeiwtnesses may choose a
wrong person from a lineup.
It is important that they
pay attention to conditions or circumstances which may
distort or influence the eyewitness' testimony.
Spec if—
ically, one should pay attention to the conditions under
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which the crime occurred.
Such factors as lighting
and how far the witness was from the criminal are
important.
One should note whether the situation
was a dynamic and changing one - whether there was
a lot of rapid, quick movement.
Eyewitnesses often
do worse under these conditions.
Stress is a major
factor - if the eyewitness was threatened, if there
was violence involved - if a weapon was present, there
is a greater likelihood of misidentification.
It is
important to consider that stress may lead to the eye
witness overestimating the maount of time the crime took,
which may involve an overestimation of the amount of
time the eyewitness had to view the criminal's face.
The number of criminals is important, as the number of
criminals may reduce accuracy since it may cut down on
the amount of time the eyewitness has available to
process other variables.
Time has important effects
upon memory — the time the eyewitness actually had to
view the criminal, the time between the crime and the
identification by the eyewitness may have major bearing
on whether an accurate identification has been made.
The circumstances of the identification should be
considered.
One should consider whether a "fair" lineup
was conducted, remembering that a "showup" or one-person
lineup is the poorest condition under which the identi
fication can take place.
One should also pay attention
to possible indications that the eyewitness was put
under pressure from the police or from authorities to
identify the suspect as the criminal.
Generally,
witnesses are more likely to correctly identify unusual
or distinctive faces.
One should also be aware that if
the eyewitness has seen the suspect previously in some
other context, that the eyewitness may have identified
the person not because he was identified with the crime,
but because the suspect's face is familiar - mistakenly
related back to the crime.
A person attempting to
judge whether an eyewitness has identified the criminal
or an innocent suspect should avoid placing any faith
in the eyewitness* confidence.
In short, in order to
tell if an eyewitness is accurate, one should place
little stock in how confident the eyewitness is about
the identification and should instead focus on situa
tional factors, including those I have mentioned, that
may have facilitated or inhibited the accuracy of the
eyewitness.
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Introduction - (read to subjects by experimental
assistant blind to the experimental hypotheses) "At the beginning of this portion of the videotape
of the trial, the prosecuting attorney asked Dr. Watkins
how accurate and reliable the average eyewitness is."
Opposing Psychologist Expert Testimonv
Prosecuting Attorney:
Are eyewitnesses really as
inaccurate and unreliable as Dr. Walters would have
us believe?
Dr. Watkins:
It depends upon the viewing conditions,
of course.
But there is no reason to doubt eyewitnesses
who had a good view of the criminal.
Generally, most
laboratory face recognition studies have found that 70%
or more of persons viewing faces under good conditions
will make an accurate identification.
P: What about eyewitness confidence - is eyewitness
confidence related to how accurate the eyewitness is?
W : Again, it depends on the conditions, but research
has found significant and positive correlations between
eyeiwntess confidence and accuracy when the viewing
conditions were good.
In the studies I mentioned
before, in which subjects saw the faces under good
viewing conditions, it was generally found that eye
witness confidence was significantly and positively
related to how accurate the eyewitness is,
P:
Dr. Walters discussed some of the methods this
research uses.
Are there any problems with the methodology of this research area?
W:
Yes.
Basically the problem is one of generalization.
In simple language, it is difficult to know how much this
research, if any, actually applies to the real world
situation.
You see, many of the conditions that subjects
experience in an experimental situation may be signifi
cantly different from the conditions faced by the victim
or observer of an actual crime.
P:
How is the situation different for subjects than for
people w h o have experienced or have seen a real crime?
W:
Well, for instance, much of the research studies had
subjects watch a videotape or film of a crime simulated
by actors.
Watching something that has been recorded is
not the same as being there, and it is debatable in any
given case as to how closely the actors are able to sim
ulate a crime.
Even the so-called "staged" crimes
deviate significantly from the average eyewitness' real
world experience.
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P:
How are staged crimes different from what an eye
witness in the real world observes?
W:
To give an example, some of the experimental para
digms or situations use the theft of a calculator as
the crime.
This is not the sort of real world crime
that would usually involve and lead up to having an
eyewitness identify a criminal from a police lineup.
The crime simply is not as serious as a major robbery
it's a far cry from a heinous crime such as murder.
Other experiments have often used the situation where
a professor is attacked while lecturing in a college
classroom.
The assault, for obvious reasons, is not
injurious to the professor and happens in front of a
classroom of college students who later make an identi
fication,
P;
Is the identification procedure used in these studies
different from what happens in a police station?
W:
Yes, the identification procedure employed in many
of these studies is much different from what actually
happens in a police lineup.
Many times, an actual lineup
isn't even held - the subjects don't identify the fake
assailant from a lineup, but rather they may be asked to
pick the assailant from an array of pictures.
P:
But doesn't having them pick the criminal from a
group of pictures tell them that the attack on the
professor wasn't real?
W:
Yes, in fact because of this, in many of these exper
iments, the experimenters tell the subjects before they
make an identification that the attack was staged and
that they are in fact participating in an experiment.
P:
Did you say that some of these studies use college
students as subjects?
W;
By far the large majority of such studies, as much
as 80 - 90% of them, use college students exclusively,
P: Are there potential problems in basing a lot of this
research on the perceptions of university students?
W:
The main problem is the one I referred to earlier one of generalization.
How much these studies apply to
people of different ages, occupations, and educational
levels is unknown.
There may be significant differences
in how, for example, a 19 year old freshman responds to
these experiments than how a 60 year old businessman
would.
To make matters worse, we do not know what dif
ferences, if any, exist.
But it is a point of concern
that the large majority of these studies are based upon
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such a narrow population, students in their early 2 0 *s
for the most part.
Pî
Watkins, based upon this research, can we predict
how reliable a certain individual in a certain eyewitness
situation will be?
W:
No.
P:

W hy not?

All of this research is based on statistical methods
which focus on how groups of people respond within a
P^^tioular experiment.
The focus is on the average
response of the group, not the individual.
Within any
P^^bicular group, there may be persons who responded very
<^ifforently or even directly opposite to the way the group
as a whole responded.
These experiments tell us how a
groups of individuals generally responded, but don't allow
us to make predictions about a certain individual.
All we
can say, if you believe the research, is what might be
likely to happen among people in general or on the average
if a certain factor is operating.
The problem is that
different individuals respond differently to different
situations and different viewing conditions.
P:
Is it possible that there may be factors that facil
itate or inhibit eyewitness reliability that have not
been investigated?
W:
It's not only possible, it's highly likely.
Much of
the research Dr. Walters talked about has been done in
the last twenty years, so it's a relatively new research
area.
It is likely that there are many additional
factors that affect eyewitness performance of which we
are unaware.
Of the factors affecting eyewitness accuracy
that we do know exist, additional research is needed con
cerning under what specific kinds of conditions and with
what types of individuals they operate.
For example, take
the phenomenon of unconscious transference - we know that
it can occur, but we are not able to specify in a par
ticular case whether it has or has not occurred.
All we
know at this point is that it exists.
P:
Is it possible that some eyewitnesses who view a crime
under poor conditions, that is under conditions where they
have a number of factors operating against them making an
accurate identification, could nevertheless make an ac
curate identification despite those factors?
W:

Yes,

it is entirely possible.

P:

Could you explain how this can happen?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

page 13 2
W:
It goes back to what I said about the statistical
design of these studies.
They reflect how the average
individual responds to a factor that inhibits accuracy.
Many people may not react at all the way the statistical
average estimates that they will.
The fact is that
there are individual differences in person' perceptual
and memory abilities.
We know that people differ in
intellectual abilities, and in their abilities to make
judgments concerning time, distance, facial recognition,
etc.
There are many people who because of certain char
acteristics or abilities may not react at all the way
these studies predict.
P: What about people's reactions to stress? Does stress
always have a negative effect on performance?
W : No.
The manner in which stress affects people is
embodied in a psychological principle called the YerkesDodson Law.
This law states that the relationship between
stress and performance is curvilinear.
That is, up to a
certain optimal point, increasing stress actually aids
performance.
It is only after the stress is increased
above this ideal point for the individual that it begins
to have negative effects.
P:
Is there any way of knowing whether the stress in a
real life crime situation was beyond the eyewitness's
optimal point?
W:
No - and that is a problem because it is usually
simply assumed that the stress was great enough upon
the eyewitness that it had negative effects.
Once again,
people differ in their abilities to handle stress and
the level of stress in one stress situation that causes
poor performance in one person may actually facilitate
the performance of another person in the same situation
who has a higher stress threshold.
p : Suppose stress did have a negative effect on a given
eyewitness to a crime - are there other factors which
could reduce or counteract the negative impact of the
stress on the eyewitness?
W:
One of the difficulties of this research is that
we have some general ideas about how a single factor,
in isolation, such as stress, affects the average person.
However, w e know very little about how a number of factors
acting simulataneously affect one another and the eye
witness.
It is possible and even likely that the effect
of a given factor that effects eyewitness accuracy in
isolation is different when combined with a number of
other viewing factors.
It is difficult to know how the
factors interact with one another since this research
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usually studies only one or at most two factors at
one time.
The real world crime situation is usually
a good deal more complex than that.
To answer your
question, it is reasonable to believe that there are
factors, such as the significance of the event and the
eyewitness' motivation to commit the criminal's face to
memory, which may mitigate some of the negative effects
of stress.
As I said earlier, additional research is
needed, especially since there may be additional factors
which affect eyewitness performance of which we are
unaware.
Pî
Dr. Walters talked about "weapon focus" as a factor
which decreases eyewitness accuracy, the idea being that
the eyewitness focuses on the weapon in a violent crime,
rather than spending the time observing the criminal's
face.
Is this a real phenomenon and could you talk
about the research it's based upon?
W:
The studies which support the existence of weapon
focus fall largely into two categories:
(1) perceptual
research in the area of experimental psychology, and
(2) naturalistic field studies and observations.
Many
of the experimental studies are thought to generalize
or apply to an eyewitness situation even though most of
the studies are laboratory research which are not direct
ly concerned with, and are often far removed from, an
actual eyewitness situation.
The naturalistic and field
studies, the second group I mentioned, represent un
controlled studies from which it isn't possible to
determine if the conclusions are accurate.
There is
one eyewitness study which supports the phenomenon of
weapon focus, but its methodology was flawed.
It in
volved having subjects identify someone who they pre
viously saw either with a weapon or without a weapon.
The methodology was flawed because the two experimental
conditions differed in more ways than whether the weapon
was present or absent.
The assailant in the weapon con
dition also had blood on his hands, was more hostile,
and made different types of statements than the assailant
in the no weapon condition.
In this one study directly
related to weapon focus, one cannot separate out whether
subjects' decreased accuracy in identification in the
weapon condition was due to the presence of the weapon
or to the other differences.
In short, while we have
some support for such a phenomenon, there is no direct
proof for the existence of weapon focus.
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^ W a t k i n s y has there been any research on how expert
psychological testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness
identification^ such as that given by Dr. Walters, effects
jurors?
W:
Yes, there have been four studies on the effects of
expert psychological testimony upon juror's decisions.
P:
And what have these studies found?
W:

They have found that having a psychologist testify
the various factors affecting eyewitness accuracy,
like Dr. Walters did, reduces jurors' belief in the
accuracy of the eyewitness.

P:
You mean that these studies found that jurors who
have heard an expert psychologist testify in the manner
Dr. Walters did were more likely to not believe the
eyewitness and to conclude that the alleged criminal
was innocent?
W:
That is correct.
Expert testimony invariably
reduced belief in eyewitness accuracy.
P:
Dr. Watkins, could you summarize for the court the
difficulties with the current eyewitness research?
W:
Y e s . While the accuracy of eyewitness depends upon
the viewing conditions, under good conditions, there is
no reason to doubt eyewitnesses, as 7 0% or more of persons
are able to make a correct identification under good
conditions.
It has been found that eyewitness confidence
is significantly and positively related to eyewitness
accuracy under such conditions.
The applicability and
generalizability of the results of many studies used to
support conclusions in this area are often questionable
because of the use of largely college age samples, the
use of films, photographs and videotapes, different
identification procedures, and the use of staged or
simulated crimes by actors which make the experimental
situation considerably different from that of an actual
crime situation.
Further, some of the studies are
methodologically flawed and experimental laboratory
research used to support conclusions are often far
removed from the real world eyewitness situation.
There
is much that we simply do not know in this area - ad
ditional work is needed on additional factors that may
facilitate or inhibit eyewitness performance.
The real
world situation is usually much more complex than these
experiments - more work is needed on how various combin
ations of facts affect one another and the eyewitness.
There is good reason to be skeptical as there is much
that isn't known and considerable difficulties exist in
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generalizing from these studies to "real" eyewitnesses.
There are four separate studies which indicate that
persons exposed to expert psychological testimony sim
ilar to Dr. Walters' testimony tend to doubt the eye
witness more and believe the defendant is not guilty.
The current state of affairs is that we cannot predict
how
reliable a single individual in a given situation
is. More work needs to be done on how the unique
characteristics of an individual affects his ability
as an eyewitness, as we know different persons respond
differently to different situations.
It is possible
that a person will respond completely different from
the way the current research predicts he or she will
respond.
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Please provide your age/ sex, year in college, and
college major on the lines below.

All information

will be kept strictly confidential.

Age:
Sex:

M

F

(circle one)

Year on College:

1 2
3
4
(circle one)

graduate student

College Major:

_______________________________

Have you ever served on a jury before?

Yes
No
(circle one)
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DEPENDENT MEASURES

Do you believe the eyewitness identified the gunman
or an innocent person? Circle one of the choices below:
Gunman

Innocent Person

How confident are you about your decision in the
above question? Indicate your answer by circling
a number on the scale provided below:
1 ------------2 ------------- 3 ------------- 4 ----------------- 5 -------- 6 ------------ 7 -------------8 --------------9
-0
— 9 -------------1

not at all
confident

absolutely
confident

Based on the testimony and evidence presented, rate
the probability of the defendant's guilt by circling
one of the numbers on the scale below:
•

8

•10

-

Definitely
Not Guilty

Definitely
Guilty

How confident was the eyewitness in the videotape
in his ability to identify the gunman? Indicate your
answer by circling a number on the scale provided below:
■4-

■

8

■10

-

Definitely
Confident

Not at all
Confident

Estimate the percentage of people who would make a
correct identification under the circumstances described
by the eywitness by circling one of the percentages
provided below:
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

To what extent do youbelieve that you can generally tell
from an eyewitness’ confidence in his testimony whether or
not theeyewitness made anaccurate identification?
Indi
cate your answer by circling a number on the scale provided
below:
1_________9_______ 1-4 ------------5 --------------- 6 -----------7 -----------8 ---------------- 9 --------1

Can almost never
tell if eyewitness
is accurate

0

Can almost always
tell if eyewitness
is accurate
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What percentage of eyewitness testimony, in general,
do your believe is accurate? Circle one of the
percentages below:
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

In deciding upon whether you thought the eyewitness
identified the gunman or an innocent person, how much
did you base your decision upon the eyewitness'
description of the crime? Circle one of the numbers
on the scale below:
1 -------------2 -------------- 3 ------------4 ------------- 5 -------------6 -------------- 7 --------- 8 -------------9 -------------1 0

Did not base
decision on eyewitness'
description of crime
at all

Based decision largely
upon eyewitness'
description of the
crime

In deciding upon whether you thought the eyewitness
identified the gunman or an innocent person, how much
did you base your decision upon the eyewitness' confidence
in his testimony? Circle one of the numbers on the scale
below:
1---- 2----- 3---- 4-----5---- 6----- 7--- 8---- 9---- 10

Did not base decision
on the eyewitness'
confidence at all

Based decision largely
upon the eyewitness'
confidence

Rate your agreement or disagreement with the following
statement on the scale provided below: The film presented
a realistic example of an eyewitness testimony.
1 -------- 2---------3 ------- 4 -------- 5-------- 6 --------- 7 ------8 -

Strongly
Disagree

------

9 -------- 10

Strongly
Agree
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(control conditions)
Please describe in your own words in the space below
how you decided that the eyewitness had identified
the gunman or an innocent person:
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(expert, only conditions)
How much did the psychologist^ s expert testimony
affect your decision concerning whether you thought
the eyewitness identified the gunman or an innocent
person? Circle one of the numbers below:
1 ---- 2-------3-4------ 5----- 6---- 7---- 8----- 9---- 10

Did not base
decision on the
psychologist's
expert testimony
at all

Based decision
largely upon the
psychologist's
expert testimony

Rate your agreement or disagreement with the following
statanent on the scale provided below:
The film
presented a realistic and believable example of a
psychologist givrnq testimony on research in the
area of eyewitness testimony.

Strongly
Disagree
Have you

Strongly
Agree
ever

tape before?

seen theexpert depicted in the video

If so, in what capacity?

Please describe in your own words in the space below
how you decided that the eyewitness had identified
the gunman or an innocent person:
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(e x p e rt plus opposing expert co nd ition s)

How much did the first expert psychologist's (Dr. Walters)
testimony affect your decision concerning whether you
thought the eyewitness identified the gunman or an
innocent person? Circle one of the numbers below:
1 --------------2 -----------3 -------------- 4 ------------ 5 -----------6 --------------- 7 --------------8 ------------9 -------------1 0

Did not base decision
on the first psychologist's
expert testimony at all

Based decision largely
upon the first psychologist's expert
testimony

Rate your agreement or disagreement with the following
statement on the scale provided below: The film
presented a realistic and believable example of a
psychologist (Dr. Walters) giving testimonv on research
in the area of eyewitness testimony.
1-----2----3----- 4---- 5----6----- 7-----8---- 9---- 10

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

How much did the opposing (second) psychologist's
(Dr. Watkins) testimony affect your decision concerning
whether you thought the eyewitness identified the
gunman or an innocent person? Circle one of the
numbers below:
1 ------------- 2 -----------3 -------------- 4 ------------ 5 -----------6 ---------------7 ------------- 8 ----------- 9 - - —

Did not base decision
on the second psycholo—
gist's expert testimony
at all

10

Based decision largely
upon the second psychologist's expert
testimony

Have you ever seen the first expert (Dr. Walters)
(jgptcted in the videotape before? If so, in what capacity?

you ever seen the second expert (Dr. Watkins)
(30pj_cted in the videotape before? If so, in what capacity?
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(expert plus opposing expert conditions)
Rate your agreement or disagreement with the following
statement on the scale provided below:
The film
presented a realistic and believable example of a
psychologist (Dr. Watkins) giving testimony on
research in the area of eyeiwtness testimony.

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Please describe in your own words in the space below
how you decided that the eyewitness had identified
the gunman or an innocent person:
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APPENDIX 6
INTRODUCTION TO EYEWITNESS VIDEOTAPES
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The purpose of the present investigation is to
determine the nature of decision making among jurors.
Please read the following description of a crime, after
which you will be viewing portions of a trial via video
tape.

You will then be asked to render a verdict as

well as answer several other questions on the basis of
the evidence presented.

Obviously, this is only a

summary to the actual court proceedings.

However,

please imagine yourself to be in a courtroom situation
and assume that you are an actual member of the jury.
If you feel that you cannot do this, please indicate
this immediately.
You will shortly be viewing portions of a trial via
videotape concerning the robbery and murder which took
place in a large town in Montana on November 14, 1981.
Previous to the portions of the trial you are viewing,
the defendant had testified and stated the following
point:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

that he did not commit the crime;
that he had been in town for only three months and
had not had the opportunity to develop close friends
or ties in the town;
that he was at home in his apartment sleeping the
night of the crime; and
that he had shopped at the 7-11 convenience store
in question two or three times in the three months
since moving to the town three months ago.

Please pay close attention to the videotape.
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APPENDIX 7

INTRODUCTION TO EXPERT TESTIMONY BY
A PSYCHOLOGIST VIDEOTAPE
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Dr, Al Walters is a Ph.D. Clinical Psychologist
who has been asked by the defense to testify as an
expert on eyewitness testimony and memory.

Dr. Walters

has 18 years of forensic and courtroom experience, and
has testified in numerous criminal cases.

He is also

a Clinical Psychology professor who teaches graduate
forensic psychology courses.
conducts,

Additionally, he actively

studies, and publishes research in the area

of eyewitness testimony and memory.

Please pay close attention to the videotape.
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APPENDIX 8
INTRODUCTION TO OPPOSING EXPERT TESTIMONY
BY A PSYCHOLOGIST VIDEOTAPE
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Dr. Watkins is a Ph.D-^ Clinical Psychologist who
was asked by the prosecution to testify concerning
eyewitness research.

Dr. Watkins has many years of

forensic experience, and has served as a forensic
consultant to the courts in a multitude of cases.

In

his role as Clinical Psychology professor, he teaches
seminars and workshops related to forensic methods.
He also regularly authors research which is published
in legal and psychological journals.

Dr. Watkins

prepared his testimony in advance in response to
Dr. Walters'

testimony, and referred to his notes

during the courtroom session.

Please pay close attention to the videotape
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